



EURAS JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume 2 Issue 2 October 2022

General DOI: [10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023](https://doi.org/10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023)

Volume 2 Issue 2 DOI: [10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023/2022.202](https://doi.org/10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023/2022.202)

EURAS JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

CONCESSIONAIRE on behalf of EURAS

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa AYDIN

Editor-in-Chief

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fabio L. Grassi

THE CO-EDITORS

Muzaffer Baca
Prof. Dr. Hasan Saygin

MANAGEMENT OF THE MANUSCRIPTS

Cemre Aydođan, Sapienza University, ITALY

Administrative Coordinator

Sabina HUSEYNOVA

Academic Studies Coordination Office

English Proofreading

Neslihan İSKENDER
Makbule Gizem TAN

Graphic Desing

Deniz Selen KAGITCI

Language

English

Publication Period

Published issues per year: April, October

Correspondence Address

EURAS-Eurasian Universites Union Secretariat, Besyol
Mah. İnonu Cad. No: 38 Istanbul-Turkey

Phone: 0212 444 1 428

Fax: 0 212 425 57 59

Web: <https://ejoh.euras-edu.org/en/>

E-mail: ejoh@euras-edu.org

Printed by

Armoni Nuans Matbaa

Address: Yukarıdudullu, Bostancı Yolu Cad. Keyap Çarşı
B- 1 Blk. N.24 Ümraniye/İST.

Phone: 0216 540 36 11 - Faks: 0216 540 42 72

E-mail: info@armoninuans.com

Editorial Board

Andrea Carteny, Sapienza University, ITALY

Andrea Lombardinilo, Università Gabriele D'Annunzio, ITALY

Anișoara Popa, Dunărea de Jos University, ROMANIA

Celal Nazım İrem, Istanbul Aydın University, TURKEY

Darko B. Vukovic, Belgrade Banking Academy, SERBIA

Scientific Advisory Board

Ahmet Sedat Aybar, Istanbul Aydın University, TURKEY

Belkıs Gürsoy, Istanbul Aydın University, TURKEY

Diego Abenante, Trieste University, ITALY

Giuseppe Motta, Roma Sapienza University, ITALY

Kudrat-E-Khuda, Daffodil International University, BANGLADESH

Mohammad Abbaszadeh, University of Tabriz, IRAN

María Teresa Nicolás Gavilan, Universidad Panamericana, MEXICO

Mohammad Nizamuddin, Superior University, PAKISTAN

Murat Erdoğan, Turkish-German University, TURKEY

Mirjana Radović Marković, Belgrade Banking Academy, SERBIA

Honor Committee

Antonello Biagini, Unitelma Sapienza University, ITALY

Felisse Marianne Z. San Juan, PHILIPPINES

Giovanna Motta, Sapienza University-Retired, ITALY

Contents

Research Articles

The Capitular Regime In The Contemporary Age And Its Abolition

Giovanni CASSANO.....171

The changes in Soviet television in the years of Gorbachev's reforms

Nicholas CONTI.....201

The Ottoman Consuls during the Cholera Epidemic of 1867

Giorgio ENNAS.....225

Bulgaria's Turkish minority and Turkey-Bulgaria relations 1923-1939

Kerime Pinar ÖZKAN.....245

Interview

A LIFE DEVOTED TO HUMANITY

.....261

DOI Numbers

General DOI: 10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023

Volume 2 Issue 2 DOI: 10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023/2022.202

The Capitular Regime In The Contemporary Age And Its Abolition

Giovanni CASSANO

10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023/ejoss_v02i2001

The changes in Soviet television in the years of Gorbachev's reforms

Nicholas CONTI

10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023/ejoss_v02i2002

The Ottoman Consuls during the Cholera Epidemic of 1867

Giorgio ENNAS

10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023/ejoss_v02i2003

Bulgaria's Turkish minority and Turkey-Bulgaria relations 1923-1939

Kerime Pınar ÖZKAN

10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023/ejoss_v02i2004

AIMS

EURAS Journal of Social Sciences (EJOSS) is a peer-reviewed international scientific open access periodical published in accordance with independent, unbiased, and double-blind peer-review principles. It publishes two issues per year and the publication language of the journal is English. The journal is an official publication of the Eurasian Universities Union (EURAS). EJOSS aims to contribute to the literature by publishing manuscripts of highest scientific level in such fields as social sciences, Sociology, Social Anthropology, Economics (Political Economy and Public Economics), Political Science, International Relations, Contemporary History.

SCOPE

EJOSS welcomes experimental outputs as well as interpretative proposals in all the fields of the (broadly intended) social sciences. The journal conforms to the Principles of Transparency and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing (doaj.org/bestpractice).

DIRECT FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Dear readers,

I am happy to introduce this third issue of our EURAS Journal of Social Sciences (EJOSS) and inform you that this issue hosts articles mainly focused on contemporary history. I hope you find them original and interesting. This time, all the authors are young and promising scholars, and their works have been carefully checked by authoritative referees and revised accordingly. I mean, our journal is also a test field for future academicians, and we're pretty pleased with it.

At the end of this issue, our staff has conducted a highly interesting interview with Muzaffer Baca, who, other than being general secretary of EURAS and one of the two co-editors of EJOSS, is a prominent figure at the International Blue Crescent Relief and Development Foundation. He provides useful information about his activities and reinforces the idea that knowledge without commitment and action is no doubt void erudition. Furthermore, the President of EURAS, Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Aydın, Ms. İrem Arman (Advisor to the President), and my old friend, Dr. Rinaldo Marmara, visited Rome for the presentation of Dr. Rinaldo Marmara's last book; a book concerning a holy place uniting Christians and Muslims, the supposed Virgin Mary's house in Ephesus (now Selçuk), which is another praiseworthy achievement of Turkish-Italian cooperation.

Last but not least, EURAS community is ready to take part in EURIE 2023, which will be held on March 1–3, 2023, in Istanbul at the Lutfi Kırdar International Convention and Exhibition Center. EURIE brings together up to 2500 international education professionals from around the world. Senior academic leaders, chief internationalization officers, study abroad coordinators, international marketing and recruitment staff, international student advisors of universities, and other stakeholders in the sector, such as ed-tech companies, service providers, education abroad consultants, and public authorities, attend EURIE. We, as EURAS, have never stopped working together to keep our relations alive.

EJOSS committee will identify overlapping interests and focus actively on them. Please feel free to write to us and let us have the benefit of your advice.

With best wishes and thanks to all our readers, reviewers, and members of the Editorial Board.

Prof. Fabio L. Grassi, PhD

EURASIAN UNIVERSITIES UNION - POWERFUL COLLABORATION THROUGH A UNIQUELY WIDE NETWORK

EURAS launched in 2008, is a non-profit international association, covering universities and other higher education institutions within the Eurasian region to promote cooperation among 120+ universities from all across the West and Central Europe, Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East as well as the whole of Asia and working for the global advancement of educational standards in the Eurasian region.

Being the cradle of all known civilizations and having 2/3 of all the world population, the Eurasian region thus represents a center of excellence in terms of educational developments and cultural flows. By building an international educational platform for regional universities, EURAS serves its members as a gateway to reach the best educational services worldwide. As per the aim of internationalization via a dynamic and communicative network, EURAS has been strongly working on a wide range of fields in order to reach the highest achievements globally.

EURAS, as one of the fastest-growing higher education associations connects universities and all the higher education institutions belonging to different geopolitical and cultural backgrounds and seeks ways to enhance their dialogue and exchange of best practices.

Eurasian Universities Union's mission summarized as follows:

- ✓ Building a platform for regional universities to reach international educational services.
- ✓ Encouraging student and academic staff mobility.
- ✓ Establishing cooperation and networking among members.
- ✓ Improving academic standards of education.
- ✓ Promoting policy development internationally.
- ✓ Representing the interests and concerns of member universities by supporting their prestige and visibility worldwide.
- ✓ Strengthening the leadership of Eurasian universities by sharing knowledge and exchanging best practices.
- ✓ Supporting innovation.

EURAS creates a wide and productive ground for mutual sharing in various academic, social and cultural areas. Each step taken for a certain end will also bring its own gateway to many other aspects and contribute to the enrichment of the activities of the members and the union. EURAS mainly target is at the following projects and services;

- ✓ Awards and scholarships.
- ✓ Certificate programs for EURAS Members.
- ✓ Database portal and Members guide.
- ✓ EURIE-Eurasia Higher Education Summit-Annual Conference of EURAS.
- ✓ Interactive platforms such as blog page and other common areas for intercommunication.
- ✓ Joint research and development activities.
- ✓ Joint projects under EU, UN and national agencies programs.
- ✓ Online events, webinars, workshops.
- ✓ Periodical and academic publications.
- ✓ Ranking systems.
- ✓ Short term programs, Summer schools, and internships.
- ✓ Student and academic exchange programs.
- ✓ Thematic conferences, seminars, and meetings.

- ✓ Volunteer programs.

EURAS has 3 academic journals;

- ✓ EURAS Journal of Social Sciences – EJOSS.
- ✓ Eurasian Journal of Health – EJOH.
- ✓ EURAS Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences – EJEAS

Eurasian Universities Union's vision is to promote sustainable peace and advanced technology worldwide through cultural developments and new educational systems. EURAS' vision for the future is to contribute to the society consisted of self-aware and highly qualified individuals benefiting from global education and mobility services. EURAS aims to open the borders of education to the public and to favor the exchange of knowledge and best practices among higher education institutions from the entire Eurasian region.

In order to accomplish these goals, we believe that connecting the universities from diverse identities can carry out the distinction in guaranteeing real equality and accessibility to excellence in educational standards.

THE CAPITULAR REGIME IN THE CONTEMPORARY AGE AND ITS ABOLITION

Giovanni CASSANO

Doctor of Historical Sciences, Sapienza University (Roma)

ORCID ID: 0000-0003-4432-2063

Mail address: giovcassano@gmail.com

Phone number: +39 3933303620

ABSTRACT

The regime of capitulations was a complex system of international agreements that regulated the status of the subjects of the Christian powers living in Ottoman country with recognition of rights, privileges and guarantees by the Sultan.¹

It originates from the exemptions and trade freedoms recognized to some Italian coastal cities in the Byzantine era. These prerogatives were then extended in a new form and with a wider and more detailed content to the nascent European states. The capitulations over the centuries have been the subject of numerous changes connected to the political, economic and social events of the Ottoman Empire.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the inadequacy of these privileges with respect to the changed situation of the Ottoman Empire and the most modern agreements concluded between States, in line with the nascent international right, was clearly manifested.

In this period, the Ottoman government became the promoter of a campaign aimed at obtaining an agreement for the abolition of the regime of capitulations.

¹ In Ottoman diplomacy the term that indicated the agreements defined in Europe "capitulation" was *ahdname*. In the Ottoman Turkish language *ahd* comes from *ahd*, "obligation", "agreement" or even "treaty", and *name*, "written", used for various types of document, such as victory letters (the *fethname*) and ambassadors' reports (the *sefaretname*).

Doi: 10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023/ejoss_v02i2001

Keywords: *Turkey, Capitulations, Abolition, Lausanne*

Introduction

Relationships between Europe and Turkey have a long history, during which capitulations played a central role in regulating the status of citizenship of Western States in the Ottoman Empire.

The present document aims at analyzing the evolution of this system, with particular reference to the phase of abolition.

The capitulations, in fact, have been subject to many changes mainly related to the political, economic and social events happened in the Ottoman Empire.

In the nineteenth century the Ottoman government promoted a long campaign aimed at defining with the signing States an agreement able to cancel the regime of capitulations. This goal was achieved only with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

The origins of the capitular regime in the modern age

The first capitulation between the Ottoman Empire and a European state was signed on February 18, 1536 with France. It was negotiated between Jean de La Foret, the first official and resident ambassador to the Sublime Porte² from 1534 to 1537, and Ibrahim Pasha, Grand Vizier under Suleiman the Magnificent, who succeeded his father Selim; although it was qualified as a treaty of alliance, it was mainly concerned with friendship and trade.³ However this document, long thought to be the first French capitulation, was never ratified, and it was only in 1569 that Claude du Bourg, treasurer of the king and ambassador to the Porte, obtained the first capitulation of eighteen articles granted to the French state. This grant came as a useful confirmation of a *de facto* establishment of a few French traders and consuls in some Ottoman ports which went back to the 1540s.⁴

France, during the reign of Louis XII, had already concluded with the

² It is an expression that refers to one of the architectural elements of the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul, the residence of the Ottoman Sultan. "Sublime Porte", during the centuries it has been used as a metonym to indicate the government of Ottoman Empire.

³ Charles White, *Three years in Constantinople; or, Domestic manners of the Turks in 1844*, London, H. Colburn, 1845, p. 139.

⁴ Edhem Eldem, *Capitulations and western trade*, in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, Vol. 3, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi, 2008, p. 290.

Mamluk Sultanate a first capitulation, which had as its main object some concessions which the French and Catalans would benefit. In 1512 the Mamluk sultan Qānsūh Al-Gūrī granted the French king Louis XII a capitulation permitting French merchants to live under his legal protection at Cairo for up to three months at a time. This appears to have been a renewal of a similar privilege given on August 23, 1507 to a French establishment at Alexandria.

This treaty was confirmed by the Ottoman Empire following the conquest of Egypt by Selim II.⁵

The Capitulation of 1536 marked as a turning point in relationship between East and West. In 1219, Louis IX, had led the Sixth Crusade that had brought to the conquest of Damietta. After three centuries his successors tried, instead, to consider Islam as a valid ally against their Christian rivals, first of all the Habsburgs.

The main advocate of the 1536 agreement with the Sultan was Francis I who had the intent to tighten the Habsburgs in a pincer maneuver, from the Balkans and from the West. This strategy did not bring great results, as the Ottoman progress in Hungary and Austria was the consequence, not so much of the pressures from the King of France, considered by the Sultan no more than an aspirant to commercial favours, but of the fear of a possible alliance between the Habsburgs, the Hungarians and the Safavid Empire, worst enemy of the Ottoman Empire from the East, and of the attraction that the Habsburgs felt for the vassal States of Moldavia and Transylvania.

For their side, in addition to military advantages, the Ottoman Empire proposed to increase the import of those goods that were scarce in its territory or in any case of strategic importance (steel, tin and fabrics). Certainly, the intention to increase customs revenue was not secondary. A correspondence was thus established between the economic policies of the European mercantilist States and the Ottoman Empire. The mercantilist States, in fact, aimed to accumulate gold through a favourable trade balance, that is, exporting as much as possible and importing as little as possible.⁶

⁵ Alexander H. De Groot, *The Historical development of the capitulatory regime in the Ottoman Middle East from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries*, in *The Ottoman capitulations: text and context*, Oriente Moderno Anno 22 (83), Nr. 3, Roma, Istituto per l'Oriente C. A. Nallino, 2003, p. 595.

⁶ James L. Gelvin, *Storia del Medio Oriente moderno* [History of the modern Middle East] Trad. it., Torino, Einaudi, 2009, p. 65.

This capitulation, like those that followed, had a limited duration of time, as its validity ceased with the death of the Sultan who had signed it. Consequently, for two centuries these documents required periodic renewal. Only with the French Capitulation 1740 the Ottoman ruler did also commit himself on behalf of his successors, eliminating the need for subsequent confirmation of the agreements.

The capitulation stipulated with France in 1536 looked as an agreement concluded between two authorities acting on a pair dignity, and not as a “gracious” concession of the Sultan. Consequently, it represented the first example in the Ottoman context of a real treaty in the modern sense.

Relationship changed in the second half of the sixteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire reached the peak of its power, also thanks to the numerous military victories, especially in the Balkans, and the figure of the sovereign began to acquire hieratic characteristics.

In this context, in adapting to the new character of sacredness that surrounded the figure of the Sultan, the capitulations became unilateral concessions that guaranteed some privileges to the European States, as it was the case with the French capitulation of 1569. Unilateral concessions were also the capitulations concluded with England in 1580 and with Holland in 1612.⁷ On behalf of England the agreement was negotiated by Sir Harebone, the first official ambassador.⁸

The change is highlighted by the addition of words such as *ahd*, “obligation”, and *aman* (*ahd ve aman*), “security”, “protection” of life and possessions granted to someone to words such as “peace” and “friendship” (*sulh ve salah*).⁹

Capitulations in the nineteenth century

At the beginning of the contemporary age, the Ottoman Empire, being a European power, enlarged the number of States with which to conclude capitulations.

⁷ De Groot, *The Historical ...*, p. 600.

⁸ White, *Three years ...*, p. 147.

⁹ Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, *La dimora della pace, considerazioni sulle capitolazioni sui paesi islamici e l'Europa* [The abode of peace, considerations on the capitulations on Islamic countries and the Europe], Venezia, Ca' Foscarina, 1996, pp. 30-31.

In 1783, the only capitulation with Russia was signed. The main concern of the Russian negotiators was to guarantee to the tsar the same commercial advantages as the French and British sovereigns.

The first Austrian capitulation, dated back to the Treaty of Passarowitz, was renewed in 1747 and in 1784 and included the Treaty of Trade and navigation and the one of settlement. Article 2 is particularly relevant, as prevented the Austrian vessels to trade in the Black Sea; this restriction, however, was abolished with the capitulation of 1784.

Other capitulations were concluded by Sweden in 1737, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1740, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in 1747, Denmark in 1756, Prussia in 1761, Spain in 1782, Hanse Cities in 1839, Portugal in 1843, Brazil in 1858, Bavaria in 1870.^{[10][11]}

Unlike the French and Russian ones, these capitulations were very synthetic. The shortest one, the Prussian, was composed only by eight chapters. Instead, the longest one, the Spanish, contained 21 chapters.

The most-favoured-nation clause was contained in each of them, at least implicitly.^{[12][13]}

The capitulations signed by three new States are particularly interesting: the United States of America in 1830, Belgium in 1838 and Greece in 1855.^{[14] [15]}

These are capitulations conceived on the model of those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, being also treaties of trade and settlement.

The capitulations kept this dual character for about three centuries, but the treaty of settlement ended up prevailing over the one of trade.

¹⁰ Robert Olson, *The Ottoman – French Treaty of 1740: A Year to be Remembered?*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Indiana University Press, 1991, p. 347.

¹¹ Lucius Ellsworth Thayer, *The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the Question of their Abrogation as it Affects the United States*, The American Journal of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 1923, Vol. 17, No. 2, p. 212.

¹² Clause in an international treaty by which the Contracting States undertake to grant each other the most favourable treatment they have granted, or possibly grant in the future, to one or more States in a given subject (trade, navigation, movement of persons, etc.).

¹³ François Georgeon, Nicolas Vatin, Gilles Veinstein, *Dictionnaire de l'Empire Ottoman* [Dictionary of Ottoman Empire], Paris, Fayard, 2015, p. 221.

¹⁴ A. K. S. Lambton, S. V. *Imtiyāzāt* [Privilege], in *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*, 2nd édition, Tome III, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1975, p. 1222.

¹⁵ Thayer, *The Capitulations* ..., p. 217.

The treaty of settlement regulated:

- the inviolability of the domicile, with the obligation for the authority to enter only with local consular assistance;
- exemption from territorial jurisdiction, both in civil and criminal matters, where the case concerned compatriots or in general citizens of Christian States;
- the right to the presence of the dragoman in both civil and criminal cases, involving Ottoman people and therefore subject to the competence of the local authority.¹⁶

In the nineteenth century, the European powers modified their trade relationships with the Ottoman Empire, stipulating numerous trade treaties with the Porte. Thus, the treaties stipulated with France in 1802, 1838 and 1861 did not contain the name of “Capitulation”, which, however, explicitly recalled, declaring that all the rights, privileges and immunities conferred by the capitulations were maintained.

The new trade treaties were written having almost exclusively as their object the determination of customs tariffs, while the old trade treaties included in the capitulations had a more general content.¹⁷

Thus, the treaty of settlement was then independent from the treaty of trade, which had absorbed it during the previous three centuries, with its autonomy recognized.

The trade and settlement treaties had basically a different requirement. The Treaties of settlement, containing consular conventions, were normally never-ending, by their nature and by the reasons which had determined them: they had to last as long as the situation which gave them birth, and its end could not generally be foreseen by the Contracting Parties.

Conversely, the trade treaty was by its nature temporary, being linked to the economic conditions of each country, subject to frequent changes.

¹⁶ The dragomen (from Arabic *tarǧūmān*) were the interpreters to whom the Europeans resorted in their relations with the Sultan’s subjects.

¹⁷ Mustafa, Fehmi, *Le capitolarioni in Turchia, la loro abrogazione e il regime post-capitolare* [The Capitulations in Turkey, their abrogation and the post-capitular regime], Rome, Tipografia Poliglotta “C. di M.”, 1930, p. 24.

It was therefore necessary to find a new regulation for trade that would take into account the economic situation of the Ottoman Empire and the different signing powers.

The independence of the two treaties meant that the abrogation of former did not involve the abrogation of the latter.

The abuses related to the capitular regime and the first steps towards its abolition

During the second half of the nineteenth century, there were many protests on the Ottoman side against the regime of capitulations. The Ottoman government promoted a campaign to abolish this system.

The opposition of the Sublime Porte to the capitular regime can be identified by two reasons.

The first was that the shape and the content of these agreements, which remained unchanged, had become inadequate in relation to the international context that had been emerging. The capitular prerogatives appeared to Ottoman politics, but also to public opinion, as old-fashioned treaties, an outdated way of stipulating conventions between States; modern conventions were concluded under the umbrella of an embryonic international law.¹⁸

The inadequacy of the capitular system was a consequence of the context in which it had matured.

The Ottoman Empire, despite having reached the apogee of power, had stipulated in the XVI-XVII centuries unilateral concessions for the benefit of the habitants of foreign powers, without any apparent advantage for the Sublime Porte and its citizens. With this policy, the Empire aimed to increase the import of those goods that were scarce in its territory or that were of strategic importance and to increase customs revenues.

However, in the long run, this choice would have proved to be harmful, creating a heavy constraint in the following centuries. It represented a complex obstacle for a state like the Ottoman one that proposed, on one

¹⁸ Giampaolo, Conte, *Il tesoro del Sultano. L'Italia, le grandi potenze e le finanze ottomane 1881-1914* [The Sultan's treasure. Italy, the great powers and Ottoman finances 1881-1914], L'Aquila, Textus Editions, 2018, p. 59.

hand, to modernize the Empire, on the other to assume a role of power with a dignity equal to the great European nations.

To achieve these goals, the Sublime Porte, starting in 1839, had started a season of reforms with the aim of modernizing the State apparatus and the army.

This pressure on change, called the “era of tanzimat” (which can be translated as “reforms”), was also due to the different economic and social conditions. The Empire was, in fact, facing one of the most complicated phases of its decline, due, among other things, to a deep financial crisis.

The second reason that made the capitular regime unpopular was the spread of the abuses connected with it. When we talk about the abuses of these agreements, we are not referring to isolated cases that occurred only in certain specific areas, but to an established system. These were a series of violations perpetuated by the representatives and citizens of the Capitular States, which undermined the sovereignty itself of the Ottoman Empire. The capitulations had in fact become an instrument that favoured European penetration into the Ottoman economy and society, reducing the Empire to a semi-colonial condition.

These abuses consisted in the fact that foreign citizens and consular authorities, going beyond the capitular prerogatives, were able to illegally escape Ottoman legislation and taxation. Not only foreigners were responsible for these abuses, but very often the Sultan’s non-Muslim subjects, in particular merchants and commercial intermediaries, who illegitimately took advantage of the concession recognized only to foreigners.

One of the most widespread abuses was to obtain, through bribes to European officials, tax exemptions and privileges not provided in the capitulations, which exempted foreigners from paying almost all taxes paid by Ottoman citizens.

One of the ways the malpractice of illegal exemptions was most manifested with was linked to the body of dragomen, employed in the embassies and consulates, following political and commercial missions, in port offices and customs of the major cities of the Empire. Non-Muslim subjects bribed foreign ambassadors and consuls to be fictitiously hired in their service as dragomen, thus taking advantage of tax exemptions and, not infrequently, of the extremely advantageous legal status provided for this

office. Symptomatic is the case of Aleppo which, in 1793, counted more than fifteen hundred local merchants who pretended to be dragomen, of which only six really played the role of interpreter.¹⁹

A further abuse of capitulations was the fact that the consulates of European countries had begun to sell to the Sultan's non-Muslim subjects, for the most part traders, trade rights with Europe, legal benefits and tax relief. In other words, Ottoman subjects belonging to minorities bribed ambassadors and consuls to be granted the same commercial and legal rights as citizens of European States. Those who had illicitly obtained one or more of these privileges, recognized through the *berats*, were called *beratlı* ^[20] ^[21]. The number of *beratlı* was by no means insignificant. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Austrians had guaranteed consular recognition to about two hundred thousand subjects of the Sultan. In the same way, the Russians had recognized it to one hundred and twenty thousand people, mainly Greek Orthodox, therefore belonging to their own religious confession. Examining only these two cases it can be estimated that ottoman subjects, in a percentage of more than 1%, were granted the same rights as Russian and Austrian citizens resident in the Empire. The British, French and Prussians also chose their preferred minority, Maronites in the case of the French, Protestants in the case of the British, and conferred them the same privileges which they benefitted themselves.²²

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman government began a campaign with the aim of reaching an agreement that would involve the suppression of the system of capitulations and that, at the same time, would fully legitimize the role of the Porte internationally as a political and economic partner, and not as a subordinate entity.²³

The first formal request to the Powers dates back to the Congress of Paris in 1856.

¹⁹ H. İnalçık, S. V. *İmtiyâzât* [Privilege] ..., pp. 1216-1217.

²⁰ In Ottoman diplomacy with the term *berat* it indicated a letter patent issued by the Sultan with the character of concession. It could be the appointment for an assignment, a privilege or the assignment of an annuity.

²¹ Cihan Artunç, *The Protégé System and Beratlı Merchants in the Ottoman Empire: The Price of Legal Institutions*, Department of Economics, Yale University, 2012, pp. 7-8.

²² Gelvin, *Storia* ..., pp. 126-127.

²³ Ahmad Feroz, *Ottoman perceptions of the Capitulations 1800-1914*, in *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 6.

During the Congress session of March 25 Alî Pasha, the plenipotentiary of the Sultan, asked for the abolition of capitulations and its corollaries which stood, he said, in the way of the renewal of the Ottoman state.²⁴

On that occasion, all the countries that had taken part in the Crimean War were gathered in the capital French. The moment was very favourable to put the matter on the table: the Kingdom of Sardinia for political reasons was not able to do without supporting the abolition of an instrument that limited the sovereignty of a State on its territory and, on the same way, France, which followed a nationalist policy, would not fail to guarantee its support to the Ottoman instance.

The Ottoman representatives, in order to convince the Powers, argued that the cessation of this system was in the interest of all parties involved. Getting rid of the capitulations and replacing them with a more modern type of treaty would have allowed Europe to have more profitable relationship with the Empire, thus benefiting resident foreigners on its territory. These arguments were apparently accepted by the European plenipotentiaries, in particular, by the Count of Cavour, who supported the Ottoman thesis with a great speech, describing the relationships between the Sublime Porte and foreigners as poorly regulated: in the mid-nineteenth century the signed treaties were antiquated and outdated, fostering the abuses.²⁵

In this climate, the Powers committed to make themselves guarantors of the independence and territorial integrity of the Porte, as can be seen from Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris:

S. M. l'Empereur des Français, S. M. l'Emmpereur d'Autriche, S. M. la Reine du Royaume-uni de la Grande bretagne et l'Irlande, s. M. le Roi de Prusse, S. M. l'Empereur, de toutes le Russies et S.M. le Roi de Sairdaine, déclarent la Sublime-Porte admise à participer aux avantages du droit public et du concert européens. Leurs Majestés s'engagent, chacun de son coté, à respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, garantissant en commun la stricte observation de cet engagement, en considéreront en conséquence, tout acte de nature à y porter atteinte comme une question d'intéret général.²⁶

²⁴ Eliana Augusti, *From Capitulations to Unequal Treaties: The Matter of an Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Ottoman Empire*, in *Journal of Civil Law Studies*, Vol. 4, 2011, p. 304.

²⁵ Fehmi, *Le capitolazioni ...*, p. 65.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

In reality, this article was limited to recognizing only formally the independence of the Sublime Porte. The encouraging promises made to the Ottoman plenipotentiaries, so that concrete efforts were made to abolish the capitulations, remained a dead letter: The Ottoman demand, although officially supported by all, in fact, was not supported by any of the European countries.

The only result achieved was the general recognition, which had been reached through a vote of the diplomats gathered in Paris, of the opportunity to review some clauses that regulated trade relationship with the Empire and the position of foreigners. At the end of the vote, a protocol was drawn up in which the Powers committed to define a review of the entire system of capitulations.

Prevision was made for a later conference at Constantinople to consider the matter of the capitulations, but this council never was called: it was clear that these statements did not correspond to a concrete will to act.²⁷

This situation, however, should not be surprising if we consider the evolution of the capitular regime over the centuries, from a “gracious” concession of the Sultan, recognized during a strong territorial expansion and strength of the Empire, to a system detrimental to sovereignty within its own borders. It was unthinkable that the European States could unilaterally give up to a system that guaranteed the almost total extraterritoriality to their citizens, in addition to the considerable advantages for those countries that, following Great Britain on the path of the industrial revolution, wanted to guarantee themselves access to the Eastern markets. In fact, France in 1861 stipulated a new capitulation that, instead of carrying out a revision of the entire system by contrasting the countless abuses, confirmed the prerogatives already recognized. Afterwards, Great Britain, the Tsarist Empire, Italy, Prussia and the German Customs Union concluded new capitulations with the Ottoman Empire on the example of the French one, to obtain confirmation of the treaties formalized earlier.

Meanwhile, between the first and second half of the nineteenth century, the Empire had embarked on the path of reforms and the new course was used by the representatives of the Porte as a further reason to insist on abolition and to legitimize their demands. As a result of this great work of

²⁷ Thayer, *The Capitulations* ..., p. 213.

reorganization and modernization, the legislation was subjected to important changes affecting several areas. It went from a law system strongly influenced by religion to a secularized law system, which did not with the religious affiliation of the party or defendant and which had as a prerequisite the equality of all individuals against the law. Law system thus conceived, being the product of the activity of the civil authorities, directed its action not only towards Ottoman citizens, Muslims or non-Muslims, but also towards foreigners.²⁸ Consequently, there could be no form of extra-territoriality affecting nationals of other countries.

A further stroke to the attempts to eliminate the capitulations dates back to 1871, when for the umpteenth time the Porta asked the powers to implement the decision voted in Paris in 1856. The answer was that there would be no change until Istanbul would have promoted very deep reforms to protect foreigners. In addition, on January 17, an agreement was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Capitular States that clearly stated the principle that a treaty could not be cancelled without an agreement between the contracting States. The powers referred to one of the basic principles of international law, precisely that right to which the Empire laboriously hoped to be admitted.

When the Empire was attempting to start a serious debate on the abolition of the capitular regime, its aspirations were frustrated by the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877. The military success of the tsarist troops over the Ottoman ones led to the conclusion of the Treaty of St. Stephen (named after the homonymous locality on the Sea of Marmara), signed in March 1878. The peace agreement, extremely favourable to the Russians who were carrying out unprecedented indirect control over the entire Balkan area, provoked the reaction of Great Britain, interested in maintaining the balance between the powers, and Austria-Hungary. Wanting to mediate between the parties, German Chancellor Bismarck organized a congress in Berlin to revise the 1878 treaty. In the German capital, the delegations of the Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, France and Italy met and the Romanian, Serbian, Montenegrin and Greek delegations were also present without a formal role.

²⁸ Gulnihal Bozkurt, *Review of the Ottoman legal system*, Vol. 3, Issue 3, Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihî Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi, Ankara, 1992, p. 9.

In Berlin, thanks to a patient and diplomatic work, the expansionist aims of the Tsarist Empire were stopped, limiting the territorial losses of the Ottoman Empire.²⁹

Istanbul was, however, obliged to grant greater guarantees to the citizens of the countries gathered at the congress and to accept the extension of the capitular prerogatives to the States whose independence had been confirmed there, such as Serbia, Romania and Montenegro. To this it was added the great result achieved by the Austro-Hungarian Empire which, despite not having participated militarily to the conflict, obtained the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, which remained only formally an Ottoman province.

Despite this failure, which had only worsened its subordinate position, in a completely unexpected way, at the end of the century, there was a time when the Porte was closer than ever to obtaining an agreement that brought to the suppression of the capitulations. In 1890, during the negotiations undertaken between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers for the renewal of the capitulations that had expired in the meantime, German diplomats expressed their willingness to comply with Ottoman demands about the abolition. During this period Germany was pursuing a policy aimed at obtaining the Sultan's favour.³⁰ This sudden opening of a European state to the abolition of the capitular regime was, however, subject to on the subscription by all the other States. Obviously, there was no definitive resolution approved by all the other powers, indeed the European Powers took advantage of that session to obtain, in addition to the renewal of the previous treaties, new concessions that allowed the privileged European companies to extend the range of their economic activity also in the strategic sectors of the Empire, such as railways and electrical infrastructure, or in services, such as postal and telephone.³¹

A turning point in the Ottoman government's campaign to abolish the capitular regime was the Revolution of 1908. In July of that year, the Young Turks, a political movement born at the end of the nineteenth century, imposed to Sultan Abdülhamit II the restoration of the Constitution of 1876,

²⁹ Egidio Ivetic, *Le guerre balcaniche*, [The Balkan Wars], Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006, pp. 13-15.

³⁰ James B. Angell, *The Turkish Capitulations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, 1901, Vo. 6, No. 2, p. 258.

³¹ H. İnalçık, S. V. *İmtiyâzât* [Privilege] ..., p. 1218.

suspended thirty years earlier by the Sultan himself after only two years of validity. Thus, a great renewal was achieved in Ottoman politics and society: in fact, radical changes date back to this period, such as greater freedom of the press and association. Censorship of the press was abolished and all the parties, Muslim and non-Muslim, Liberals, Islamists, and Unionists, published their own papers so as to publicize their views. It is therefore possible to speak of an emerging public opinion during these years. The capitulations were a constant theme discussed in the press of the day.

The intense debate that characterized Ottoman society at this stage made the presence of a system such as the capitular system even more unbearable, perceived by public opinion increasingly inadequate to the contingencies of the present and an obstacle to the desired adhesion of the Porte to the new international dimension of those years. Moreover, the cabinets controlled and then led by the Young Turks intended to pursue a policy that would not prove to be tolerant of any form of limitation of the sovereignty of the state within its borders.³²

The attitude of the executive was directed, rather than to the achievement of a complete and, above all, immediate cancellation of the capitular regime, towards a revision or towards the choice of a transitional period of five years before the definitive abolition.

After the Young Turk Revolution, there were two moments when Istanbul carried out the campaign more effectively, gaining the support of some European States for its cause. The first opportunity was on October 6th, 1908 with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary. The Empire had to accept the loss of the two provinces in exchange to the renunciation of the counterpart to the Sandžak of Novi Pazar, an Ottoman enclave between Serbia and Montenegro that had been militarily occupied immediately after the Congress of Berlin. This compromise was signed in a protocol between the two Powers on February 26th, 1909. The agreement also contained Vienna's commitment not to fail to support any future Ottoman initiative aimed at achieving the abolition of capitulation.

Article 6 committed Austria-Hungary to terminate within the next ten years trade agreements independently from those contained in the capitu-

³² Feroz, *Ottoman perceptions ...*, p. 17.

lations, based on the public law applied in similar agreements in Europe. This was a significant deviation.^{[33] [34]}

The second circumstance in which the Porte managed to achieve important results is represented by the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish war in 1911. Immediately after the invasion of the provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, which represented the last Ottoman strips between Egypt, a British controlled zone, and Tunisia, a zone of French control, the German ambassador in Istanbul, Marshall von Bieberstein, became the guarantor of the Italians who were in the Empire. On October 2nd, the Ottoman government recognized German protection, specifying that all the capitular rights that Italian citizens had enjoyed up to that time lost its validity for the duration of the conflict.

Rome reacted by protesting to the Council of Diplomatic Litigation and denounced the unilateral decision of the Empire. The Council confirmed the illegitimacy of the positions taken by the Porte, believing that not even a state of war between the two countries could lead to the deprivation of the prerogatives attributed to the Italians by the capitulations.

Italy decided to bring the matter to the attention of the other countries, believing that the temporary cessation of the validity of these prerogatives due to the beginning of a conflict was a problem that concerned all the Capitular States.

These attempts had very limited effects. Moreover, the Italian Government did not intend to insist on this issue, as at that very moment the first negotiations with the Porte had begun.

The defeat on the ground of the Ottoman Empire led to the signing of the treaty with Italy, which contained conditions very similar to those of the agreement with Austria-Hungary and established an increase in tariffs from 11% to 15%. In addition to the stipulation of a new trade agreement on the model of the one with Austria-Hungary, Italy undertook to guarantee to the Empire support for its campaign for the abolition of capitulations and support in international integration both politically and economically.³⁵

³³ Pierluigi La Terza, *Abolizione delle capitolazioni in Turchia* [Abolition of capitulations in Turkey], Rome, Tipografia Garroni, 1924, pp. 15-16.

³⁴ Mehmet Emin Elmacı, *Itihat-Terakki ve Kapitülasyonlar* [Union-Progress and Capitulations], Istanbul, Homer Yayınları, 2018, pp. 51-52.

³⁵ *Ivi*, p. 55.

Article 5 provided for the acknowledgment by Italy of the legitimacy of the Ottoman reasons that had led the Porte to ratify during the conflict the cancellation of the capitular rights.

This was perhaps the most relevant clause of the document, as such acknowledgment by one of the European Powers was particularly significant for the immediate future. In this way, the Ottoman government was given the power to unilaterally revoke prerogatives already recognized, although in a completely exceptional situation such as a war.

The Ottoman Empire in World War I

The Porte succeeded to obtain the abolition of capitulations only after the outbreak of the First World War. Initially, during the summer of 1914, the Ottoman government had tried to achieve this result by seeking the support of countries such as Great Britain and France, declaring itself willing to maintain its neutrality in the ongoing conflict in exchange for the signing of a convention that issued the abolition. After having obtained no adequate guarantees, on 9 September Ottoman grand vizier and foreign minister Said Halim Pasha notified the embassies of the countries concerned by the decision to abolish the capitular regime with effect from October 1st.³⁶ The memorandum describing the decision noted that:

These privileges, which on the one hand were found to be incomplete opposition to the juridical rules of the century and to the principle of national sovereignty, constituted on the other hand an impediment to the progress and the development of the Ottoman Empire.³⁷

The cancellation of prerogatives at the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish war had represented a precedent that the Ottoman representatives used to reach the unilateral act of 1914.

The moment was very favourable: since the war had already been going on for several months, it would have been impossible for the European Powers engaged in the conflict to organize a common reaction to restore an instrument that had proved to be extremely advantageous.

³⁶ Georgeon, *Dictionnaire ...*, pp. 222-223.

³⁷ Kate Dannies, Stefan Hock, *A Prolonged Abrogation? The Capitulations, the 1917 Law of Family Rights, and the Ottoman Quest for Sovereignty during World War I*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 2020, 52 (2), p. 245.

The day after the note was delivered, 10 September, became a day of celebration, as important as Constitution Day, observed 23 July. People decorated their shops and houses with flags. The press hailed 9 September as the day of freedom and independence. Meetings were organized in the capital and in provincial towns in support of the government.³⁸

In addition, the Empire, joining secretly the conflict on the side of Germany since August 2nd, could count on the support of the Central Powers for the pursuit of its goal.

Finally, the European Powers would in any way have put at risk the safety of their citizens resident in Ottoman territory at such a critical time.

In response, the Capitular States sent a communication to the Empire in order to refuse the reasons for the Ottoman decision. This was not a polemic note, but a reference to the principle that no country could unilaterally modify or even cancel an international agreement without the consent of all the parties involved.

It was, in fact, evident that a total rejection of the Ottoman position would lead Istanbul to join militarily the war on the side of Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, greatly extending the battlefield. To avoid this eventuality, the representatives of Great Britain, France and the Tsarist Empire forwarded a new note to the government in Istanbul, identical to the previous one, specifying however that they were willing to examine any request in this regard, in order to modify the clauses of the treaties that were more distant from international law. The only condition was the assurance by the Ottoman government not to enter the conflict on the side of the Central Powers.

The Porte remained impassive and decided to insist in the established direction, taking advantage of the unrepeatable moment. The following October they implemented what was announced, closing all post offices run by foreign companies, increasing customs duties, obliging foreigners to pay taxes from which they had been exempted for centuries, eliminating consular courts and revoking the possibility of making use of the dragomen in legal disputes. The Ottoman Empire, more than fifty years after the first formal request to the Congress of Paris, implemented the abolition of capitulations.

³⁸ Feroz, *Ottoman perceptions* ..., p. 18.

In the same month, the Ottoman Empire entered the conflict militarily against the forces of the Entente.

On March 16, 1915 the Sublime Porte regularized the condition of foreigners in its territories, promulgating a “Law on the rights and duties of foreigners”.³⁹

Over the next three years, the main allies of the Ottoman Empire ratified a series of conventions, accepting the definitive abolition of capitulations. The first was Germany on January 11th, 1917; on 11th March of the following year, Austro-Hungary.⁴⁰

The situation that was emerging seemed to confirm the success of the Ottoman policy in achieving abolition, which would have favoured the integration of the Empire with the other Powers and the formation of a new model of relationship at the international level that would allow the Porte to shake off a type of treaty now outdated. But the legitimate aspirations of the Sublime Porte would be frustrated by the military setbacks suffered by its army during the conflict.

On October 30th, 1918, the Ottoman Empire signed the armistice that sanctioned the end of hostilities.

Some of the clauses of the document provided the obligation for Istanbul to restore almost entirely the capitular prerogatives, suppressed during the previous four years. The only difference was the creation of a mixed Judicial Commission, competent to judge legal disputes between all individuals of different nationalities.⁴¹

Between Sèvres and Lausanne: reimposition and definitive abolition

The armistice dictated the rules to be observed until the peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente Powers was concluded.

The treaty was signed on August 10th, 1920 in the French town of Sèvres by representatives, albeit of secondary importance, of the government of Istanbul and those of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Greece. The document had a strongly punitive character for the defeated, bringing to

³⁹ Thayer, *The Capitulations ...*, p. 230.

⁴⁰ Fehmi, *Le capitolazioni ...*, pp. 75-76.

⁴¹ La Terza, *Abolizione ...*, pp. 23-24.

the separation between Turkish and non-Turkish territories of the Empire and the division of Anatolia into zones of influence French, British, Greek and Italian. The Empire, already seriously reduced by the results of the First Balkan War, was thus divided among the Allied Powers.⁴²

The harshness of the treaty was evident, as well as in the territorial revision and, in the economic clauses. In particular, Articles 261 and 317 re-established the capitular regime, extending it to Allied countries that did not benefit from it before the war, such as Japan.

The potential modification of these prerogatives was up to the Financial Commission, which would rule on the Empire, managing with no limitations almost all its resources.

Despite the reintroduction of capitulations, in Sèvres, the Allied countries agreed on the need to replace the capitular regime, formulating a judicial reform project in a very short time. Article 136 stipulated that, within three months of the entry into force of the Treaty, a commission would be set up composed by representatives of four winning countries, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, with the aim of studying as soon as possible a judicial reform to replace the current system. The work of the commission would be submitted for final approval of all the other countries concerned, but not of the Turkish Government: with the signing of the peace treaty, the Turkish undertook to accept any decision of the victorious Powers.⁴³

The treaty was criticized not only by Turkey, but also by international public opinion. It is not a coincidence that many, perfectly aware of its impracticability, ironically defined it as the “porcelain treatise”, playing with the porcelain manufacturing tradition of the French town.

The decisions taken in Sèvres remained, in fact, a dead letter, since the treaty was not ratified by any of the signatory parties. In this situation, subsequent political and military events were decisive, starring Mustafa Kemal. Few at the time could have imagined the breadth and depth of the changes it would have brought.

Kemal was born on May 19th, 1881 in Thessaloniki. Trained in various military academies, he had fought within the Ottoman forces during the

⁴² Gelvin, *Storia ...*, pp. 235-236.

⁴³ La Terza, *Abolizione delle capitolazioni ...*, pp. 24-25.

Italo-Turkish War and the Balkan Wars. He had gained great prestige at the Battle of Gallipoli in 1915, becoming a national hero. In April 1919 he was appointed by the government, with the approval of the British, inspector at the 9th Army stationed in Erzurum to deal with demobilization and to keep order within the same Turkish regular units.

This decision was a gamble, in fact Kemal placed himself at the head of the Turkish nationalist movement, rebelling against the government of Istanbul, and founded the government of the Grand National Assembly (in Turkish *Büyük Millet Meclisi*, BMM), creating a counterpower in Ankara. Kemal was elected president. On January the 20th, Assembly, following the approval of a Constitution defining the nation as a “Turkish State”, changed its name to *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, TBMM, (Grand National Assembly of Turkey).⁴⁴

The Treaty of Sèvres, presented to the Assembly on May the 20th, 1920, was not accepted.

Meanwhile, Greece, considering the political and military situation very favourable, had begun hostilities against Turkey. The Greek army, better equipped, obtained, in a first phase, some important successes. The tenacious resistance of the Turkish forces led, however, to the defeat of the invader. The following year, the Turkish army took the initiative and achieved the final victory. On October the 11th, 1922, the armistice of Mudanya was signed.

The many military victories and the determination of the Turkish people to pursue independence had in fact altered the outcome of the First World War, forcing the Allied powers to return to the negotiating table.⁴⁵

On October 27th, 1922, the Allied Powers convened a new peace conference, to be held in Lausanne the following month, to which both governments of Turkey were invited. Kemal was, however, convinced that only the Ankara government should take part in the conference.

On November 1st, the Grand National Assembly passed, with only one vote against, a resolution that legitimized itself as the only authority that could represent Turkey.

⁴⁴ Gelvin, *Storia* ..., pp. 235-236.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*.

With this law, which had retroactive effect, Turkey declared null and void the Treaty of Sèvres, signed by ministers who had no authority to decide on behalf of the Turkish nation. From this moment on, the government of Istanbul was delegitimized, no longer being able to legally represent the country.

The formal abolition of the Sultanate marked the *de facto* end of the Ottoman Empire.

In Lausanne, in the castle of Ouchy, the delegations of France, Japan, Italy, Great Britain, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the United States (the latter as observers) and Turkey met. Kemal had wanted at all costs to head the delegation İsmet İnönü, who had recently become Foreign Minister.

There were still many issues to be resolved: for example, the territorial issues, namely that of Mosul, Western Thrace, Alexandretta and the Straits, but also the issue of Turkey's economic independence, perceived as incompatible with the capitular regime. For this reason the Turkish delegates were adamant on the subject, firmly convinced that they did not accept a resolution that would leave this system. In fact, if all the delegations seemed to agree on the opportunity of the abolition, nevertheless Great Britain, France and Italy asked for a regime, at least transitional, that would offer adequate guarantees for their citizens.

On November 20th, during the first plenary session, three commissions were set up, each with the task of studying one of the subjects brought to the attention of diplomats. The second commission, the Commission for the Regime of Foreigners and Minorities in Turkey, would deal with, among other things, the capitulations.⁴⁶

It was chaired by the head of the Italian delegation, the Marquis Camillo Eugenio Garroni, who, first of all, proposed and obtained to form subcommittees to analyze more effectively the issues that had been entrusted to him. A first subcommittee dealt with reviewing the legal regime of foreigners, a second the regime of foreigners from an economic point of view and a third the questions of citizenship and archaeological research in Turkish sites.

⁴⁶ *Diplomatic documents relating to peace with Turkey*, presented to the Italian Parliament: minutes of the plenary sessions and sessions of the Commissions of the Lausanne Conference, Rome, Tipografia del Senato, 1923, vol. 1 p.8.

A first debate on the legal basis of the capitulations followed. The British delegate Curzon, who chaired the Conference, argued that, since these are commitments in accordance with international law, they could not be modified or cancelled without the agreement of all the parties involved.

On the other hand, the head of the Turkish delegation replied that these treaties had the character of a unilateral act and, therefore, could be revoked at any time.

After these preliminary discussions, the work of the subcommittees began. Numerous proposals were formulated to be presented to the attention of Turkish diplomats, who deal with the right to purchase movable and immovable property and to be able to leave them as an inheritance, the exercise, without any constraint, of all those professions also carried out by Turkish citizens, equality from a fiscal point of view with Turkish citizens.⁴⁷

In addition to these issues, the discussion on the Judicial Declaration continued between the Allied delegations and the Turkish delegation.

With this respect, the Turkish counter-proposals differed greatly from the Allied proposals. Meanwhile, the discussion on Mosul and the public debt was at an impasse, as it was the jurisdictional discipline. This helped to frustrate months of long and patient negotiations. This situation led to the suspension of the work of the Conference, bringing Turkey and the Allied countries back into a state of great tension.⁴⁸

Later, there was the economic congress convened by Kemal in the city of Smyrna. On this occasion, he made it clear, to both domestic and international public opinion, that the attainment of complete independence could only be achieved on condition that there was also economic and legal independence. The achievement of these objectives could not be separated from the abolition of capitulations.

On April 23th, more than two months after the suspension, the delegations met again in Lausanne and resumed work on a further attempt to reach a peace treaty. From the very beginning, the discussion was characterized by a lively debate, which led to the approval, on June 4th, of the

⁴⁷ La Terza, *Abolizione ...*, pp. 24-26.

⁴⁸ *Ivi*, pp. 26-29.

final text of the Declaration Relating to Judicial Administration.

At this point, a draft of the text of the treaty was submitted to the Turkish delegation that would have involved the abolition of capitulations.⁴⁹

After further talks, an agreement was reached on a new text - in the final document it would have been Article 28 - which set off the complete abolition of the capitular regime:

Each of the High Contracting Parties Hereby accepts, in so far as it is concerned, the complete abolition of capitulations in Turkey in every respect.⁵⁰

Four centuries after the first capitulation between the Ottoman Empire and a Christian State, the capitular regime was abolished by a convention. İsmet İnönü ensured that the cessation was final, being independent of the validity of the treaty over time and being precluded from the possibility of restoring later the capitular regime, with retroactive effect.

The peace treaty was signed on July the 24th, 1923 and the first signatory was the head of the Turkish delegation. The entire document consisted of 143 articles; Article 28 enshrined the complete abolition of capitulations.

The Convention on Settlement and Jurisdiction and the Declaration on Judicial Administration, signed on the same date by the delegations of the Allied States and Turkey, provided guarantees for foreigners.

The Treaty of Lausanne completely erased Sèvres; moreover, Turkey, which existed only in practice, obtained legal recognition at international level.

1923 was a crucial year for Turkey. On October 29th, the *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* (Republic of Turkey) was proclaimed and Kemal, elected president by the TBMM, appointed İsmet İnönü as prime minister.

Turkey emerged fully legitimized by the Lausanne Conference, as a sovereign state.

⁴⁹ *Ivi*, pp. 32-33.

⁵⁰ Text in *Trattati e Convenzioni* [Treaties and Conventions], Vol. XXX, p. 14, quoted in Prassi Italiana di Diritto Internazionale, ISGI Istituto di Studi Giuridici Internazionali – CNR.

Following the signing of the peace treaty, on the same date, the delegation signed, as an annex to Article 28, a Convention on Settlement and Jurisdiction, which defined the rights of foreigners in Turkey, and a Declaration on Judicial Administration.

These acts contained the reciprocity clause, recognizing the enjoyment of the same rights to Turkish citizens and those of allied countries.⁵¹

The Convention and the Declaration were valid for seven and five years respectively.

All guarantees in confessional matters were excluded, because they were already present in Articles 38 and 44 of the peace treaty, in the *Protection of Minorities* section. Turkey recognized freedom of ritual, both in private and public contexts, to all those who resided in its territory, therefore also to foreigners. The only exception to this provision was provided in the event that a certain religious practice was destabilizing public order.⁵²

Capitulations' perceptions in historiography

In the nineteenth century, especially in the “era of *tanzimat*”, the abolition of capitulations became a priority for the Ottoman government and the main objective of its foreign politics.

In society and public opinion there was the deep-rooted idea that, since these were unilateral concessions, the capitulations could have been revoked at any time by the Ottoman government.

This thesis was also shared by the republican historians in the years following the Lausanne Conference. Thus, the scholar Ismail Hami Danişmend, dealing with the matter of the abolition, defined the capitulations as a set of privileges granted to the European states' citizens as a title of favour that, over the centuries, had become a harmful element for the Ottoman Empire: they represented, in fact, a significant limitation to its sovereignty.

⁵¹ Fehmi, *Le capitolazioni ...*, p. 97.

⁵² La Terza, *Abolizione delle capitolazioni ...*, pp. 34-35.

Such a perception of the capitular regime is due to the fact that traditionally for the Ottomans the capitulations were a decree or edict from the sultan, not a treaty, therefore a bilateral agreement in accordance with the principles of international law.

In fact, while in Europe these documents were called “capitulations”, in the Ottoman Empire was used the term “*İmtiyāzātı ecnebiye*” or just “*İmtiyāzāt*”, which means “privilege, grant, concession”.

This interpretation was shared by Mehmet Zeki Pakalin, who stated that, until the eighteenth century, the Sublime Porte had never signed any treaty that could not be freely revoked by the sultan.

Halil İnalçık agreed with this thesis, adding that during the modern age the sultans revoked such concessions when a European state had broken the promise of “friendship and sincere goodwill”.⁵³

During the years following the abolition, these feelings represented also a fundamental aspect of Kemalist self-consciousness. Overcoming the capitulations was consistent with some of the principles that inspired the action of the Turkish National Movement. In fact, the Porte regime was in contrast with the long claimed principle of sovereignty by the unionist propaganda, especially in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire.

There is an anti-imperialist tradition that regards these treaties as a tool that favoured the penetration of European capital into the Ottoman economy, reducing the Empire to a semi-colonial condition.

In fact, it is deeply believed that, in the late Ottoman Empire, many European countries, in particular France, Great Britain and Germany, exploited the Ottoman political weakness to develop projects of economic, military and infrastructural concessions for exclusive European benefit.

Moreover, the abuses connected with the capitular regime have been indicated by many historians as one of the causes of the general decline of the Porte. Among these Ahmad Fuad Fanani’s important work,

⁵³ Feroz, *Ottoman perceptions* ..., pp. 1-2.

“The Ottoman Empire: Its Rise, Decline and Collapse” can be recalled.⁵⁴

The memory of the capitulations has certainly contributed to the fueling of the anti-Western feelings that still animates Turkish politics. President Erdoğan himself has repeatedly quoted the poet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, who rejected Atatürk’s policies of Westernization, hoping for a return to the “authenticity” of the East: Islamic values, embodied by the Ottoman Empire at its apogee.⁵⁵

Conclusions

This *excursus* certainly does not exhaustively resolve the question of an institution that had a central importance in regulating the condition of the citizens of the Western States present in the Ottoman Empire, but attempted to offer an analysis of its evolution between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

It is above all in this period that the inadequacy of the capitular prerogatives with respect to the changed situation of the Sublime Porte and the new way of making pacts with other States was clearly manifested, which was moving towards a more modern type of agreement, in line with the nascent international law.

The economy, with its changed rules and needs, has been a decisive push in overcoming them, imposing the stipulation of specific and detailed commercial treaties, free from the regulation of the personal status of foreigners.

The perception of the inadequacy of the capitulations must also be read in correlation with the internal processes that were changing the administration, society, army, law and teaching. The Ottoman Empire had begun a phase of reforms in an attempt to put itself on the path of modernization, like other countries in the east, for example of the Tsarist Empire and Japan, the latter during the *Meiji* period.

Certainly, the capitulations were an instrument suited to the needs of the historical era in which they were born, becoming, however, in the following centuries a completely inadequate instrument with respect to the changed political, commercial and social needs.

⁵⁴ Ahmad Fuad Fanani, *The Ottoman Empire: Its Rise, Decline and Collapse*, Jurnal Salam Pascasarjana Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, 2011, p. 101.

⁵⁵ Necip Fazıl Kısakürek in 1943 began publishing the magazine “*Büyük Doğu*” [Great East], Istanbul, 1943-1978.

The events that led to the abolition of this system and the Ottoman perception of these treaties may be useful, from a historiographical point of view, to understand the reasons that led some personalities to commit themselves to the birth of the Republic of Turkey and led the protagonists of this phase to seek diplomatic instruments more suitable for integrating the country at a political and economic level.

Future developments in research on the subject could be directed precisely towards these reasons. It is not to be excluded, indeed it is likely, that these reasons are still present today in the Turkish political landscape and public opinion. Moreover, the same “Sèvres syndrome” continues to be a recurrent element and of a certain effectiveness in the Turkish political debate, object of attention not only of historiography, but also of other disciplines, such as sociology.

References

AA.VV., *Encyclopédie de l’Islam*, Nouvelle édition, S. V. *Imtiyāzāt* [Privilege], Tome III, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1975.

AA.VV., *Trattati e Convenzioni* [Treaties and Conventions], Vol. XXX, p. 14, quoted in *Prassi Italiana di Diritto Internazionale*, ISGI Istituto di Studi Giuridici Internazionali – CNR.

Angell James B., *The Turkish Capitulations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, 1901, Vo. 6, No. 2.

Artunç Cihan, *The Protégé System and Berathlı Merchants in the Ottoman Empire: The Price of Legal Institutions*, Department of Economics, Yale University, 2012.

Augusti Eliana, *From Capitulations to Unequal Treaties: The Matter of an Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Ottoman Empire*, in *Journal of Civil Law Studies*, Vol. 4, 2011.

Bozkurt Gulnihal, *Review of the Ottoman legal system*, Vol. 3, Issue 3, Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi, Ankara, 1992.

Conte Giampaolo, *Il tesoro del Sultano. L’Italia, le grandi potenze e le finanze ottomane 1881-1914* [The Sultan’s treasure. Italy, the great powers and Ottoman finances 1881-1914], L’Aquila, Textus Editions, 2018.

Dannies Kate, Hock Stefan, *A Prolonged Abrogation? The Capitulations, the 1917 Law of Family Rights, and the Ottoman Quest for Sovereignty during World War I*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 2020, 52 (2).

De Groot Alexander H., *The Historical development of the capitulatory regime in the Ottoman Middle East from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries*, in *The Ottoman capitulations: text and context*, *Oriente Moderno* Anno 22 (83), Nr. 3, Roma, Istituto per l’Oriente C. A. Nallino, 2003.

Eldem Edhem, *Capitulations and western trade*, in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, Vol. 3, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi, 2008.

Elmacı Mehmet Emin, *İttihat-Terakki ve Kapitülasyonlar* [Union-Progress

and Capitulations], Istanbul, Homer Yayınları, 2018.

Fanani Ahmad Fuad, *The Ottoman Empire: Its Rise, Decline and Collapse*, Jurnal Salam Pascasarjana Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, 2011.

Fehmi Mustafa, *Le capitolazioni in Turchia, la loro abrogazione e il regime post-capitolare* [The Capitulations in Turkey, their abrogation and the post-capitular regime], Rome, Tipografia Poliglotta “C. di M.”, 1930.

Feroz Ahmad, *Ottoman perceptions of the Capitulations 1800-1914*, in Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, Oxford University Press, 2000.

Gelvin James L., *Storia del Medio Oriente moderno* [History of the modern Middle East] Trad. it., Torino, Einaudi, 2009.

Georgon François, Vatin Nicolas, Veinstein Gilles, *Dictionnaire de l'Empire Ottoman* [Dictionary of Ottoman Empire], Paris, Fayard, 2015.

Ivetic Egidio, *Le guerre balcaniche*, [The Balkan Wars], Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006.

La Terza Pierluigi, *Abolizione delle capitolazioni in Turchia* [Abolition of capitulations in Turkey], Rome, Tipografia Garroni, 1924.

Olson Robert, *The Ottoman – French Treaty of 1740: A Year to be Remembered?*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Indiana University Press, 1991.

Pedani Fabris Maria Pia, *La dimora della pace, considerazioni sulle capitolazioni sui paesi islamici e l'Europa* [The abode of peace, considerations on the capitulations on Islamic countries and the Europe], Venezia, Ca' Foscarina, 1996.

Thayer Lucius Ellsworth, *The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the Question of their Abrogation as it Affects the United States*, The American Journal of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 1923, Vol. 17, No. 2.

White Charles, *Three years in Constantinople; or, Domestic manners of the Turks in 1844*, London, H. Colburn, 1845.

THE CHANGES IN SOVIET TELEVISION IN THE YEARS OF GORBACHEV'S REFORMS

Nicholas CONTI

Sapienza University of Rome

conti.1904349@studenti.uniroma1.it

Summary

This study intends to analyze the political, social and cultural role of Soviet television in the years of Mikhail Gorbachev. The author investigates the new television programs, their contents and the new Soviet legislation around the media in order to obtain information on the socio-political impact that the television medium has played in the historical events that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

This text, which briefly reviews the new television programs that arose after the start of glasnost and generally analyzes the «new way of doing TV» of those years, is intended to be an introduction to the study of late Soviet television. In fact, as demonstrated in the article, television played a leading role in the intricate events that led to the collapse of the Soviet empire, from a cultural, political and legislative point of view.

Keywords: *Glasnost, Soviet television, Vremya, Telemost, Vzglyad, Media Law, January Events.*

1. *Brief history of television in the Soviet Union*

The development of television in the Soviet Union began, as in the United States and Western Europe, in the 1930s. The first regular service began on March 10, 1939. It included just a hundred television stations in the Moscow region and broadcast images of the opening of the 18th CPSU Congress.¹

The importance of television as a tool for broadcasting, indoctrination, and propaganda was immediately understood by the Soviet leadership, so much so that in the first Five-Year Plan in the aftermath of World War II the expansion of the television apparatus was described as a top priority. The Soviet Union consisted of fifteen republics and contained more than a hundred different nationalities within it; television was seen as the means to unite the various nationalities into one united socialist state.

In 1950 there were 10,000 televisions throughout the Soviet Union, but only ten years later there were already nearly five million.² In 1967 color broadcasting began in Moscow and Leningrad, thanks to the use of the SECAM system, jointly developed by French and Soviet technicians.

In the 1940s and 1950s, television programs were broadcast locally, as the available technology did not yet allow for simultaneous broadcasting throughout the vast Union.³

The Brezhnev era is when Soviet television reached its highest rate of growth and development. In 1970, a much more centralized television programming system was established by decree; from this time, every city or regional television studio anywhere in the Union had to submit to direct orders from Moscow. 1973 was the year of the reorganization of the «State Committee of Television and Radio Broadcasting», known by its acronym *Gosteleradio*, the main state body overseeing all television and radio broadcasting in the Soviet Union.⁴

¹ BRIAN MCNAIR, *Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet media*, London-New York, Routledge, 1991, p. 40.

² ELLEN MICKIEWICZ, *Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union (Communication & Society)*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 3.

³ MICHAEL J. BAZYLER and EUGENE SADOVOY, *Television and the Law in the Soviet Union*, Digital Commons LMU and LLS, Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review, 1991, p. 298.

⁴ *Gosteleradio* had been created as early as 1967 with the function of organizing state propaganda. In 1973 it was reorganized to give absolute importance to the television medium.

The first national television network began operating in 1960 and was called *Pervaya Programma* (literally «First Program», but translatable as «First Channel»). *Pervaya Programma* was the first network to operate throughout the Union and it was forbidden for local television stations to interfere in any way with its programming, which was determined by Moscow.⁵

In 1967 in the Ostankino Television Technical Center, on the outskirts of Moscow, the construction of the famous Ostankino Tower was completed. The 540-meter-high tower is still the center of Russian broadcasting.

The second national television network arrived in 1982 and was named *Vtoraya Programma* («Second Channel»): on this channel, local networks had greater freedom to intervene and include regional programs.⁶ Meanwhile, *Tretya Programma* («Third Channel») and *Chetvertaya Programma* («Fourth Channel») had been launched in Moscow in 1962 and 1967, with the stated aim of being «educational channels» but in fact educating official Communist Party propaganda.⁷

During the Brezhnev years, the function of Soviet TV was purely propagandistic: all content was directly controlled from above, there was little entertainment and much politics glorifying the state and the General Secretary. A popular joke in those years read:

A viewer turns on the TV and finds, on the first channel, Brezhnev giving a long speech. He switches to the second channel: again, Brezhnev still buzzing. On the third channel, a uniformed officer points a gun at the viewer and orders: Comrade, go back to the first channel!⁸

The main Soviet newscast, *Vremya* («Time»), began airing on January 1, 1968, and, except for an interruption between 1991 and 1994, has continued to be broadcast to the present day. Until just before the advent of Gorbachev, rather than a Western-style newscast, *Vremya* was a veritable bulletin of the Soviet government; all news that did not glorify the communist government was omitted and the capitalist West was frequently portrayed negatively.

⁵ MICHAEL J. BAZYLER and EUGENE SADOVOY, *Television and the Law...*, p. 300.

⁶ ELLEN MICKIEWICZ, *Split Signals...*, p. 6.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

⁸ HEDRICK SMITH, *The New Russians*, New York, Random House, 1990, p. 162.

Vremya lasted approximately thirty minutes and aired on both national channels simultaneously at nine o'clock in the evening, with a repeat the next morning; it was broadcast throughout the Union and for years was the most powerful medium of Soviet propaganda. According to a study by Gosteleradio, in 1985 90% of the Soviet population considered *Vremya* their main source of information.⁹ The structure of the newscast was very strict: it always began with news from within the Union (omitting any negative news such as clashes, famine or natural disasters); then it went on to list the achievements of socialism in industry and agriculture and finally the last part was devoted to international news, sports and weather forecasts.¹⁰

The rise of Gorbachev and his reforms completely revolutionized the way television was done in the Soviet Union. According to many observers, the television itself was the driving force behind glasnost and was a pioneer in breaking many of the taboos that had constrained Soviet media for decades.¹¹

2. *The years of Gorbachev and «Prozhektor Perestroiki»*

As early as December 1985 Gorbachev decided to retire Sergey Lapin, head of Gosteleradio since 1970, and replace him with Aleksandr Aksenov, former Premier of the Belarusian RSS.

With the implementation of glasnost, within a few months, Soviet television became unrecognizable; tight top-down control was dispensed with and a wealth of new television programs were born, embodying what was undoubtedly the most radical part of liberalization. The new programs were numerous, but the most important and revolutionary was probably *Prozhektor perestroiki* («Прожектор перестройки», translatable as *Spotlight on Perestroika*).¹²

⁹ ELLEN MICKIEWICZ, *Split Signals...*, p. 32.

¹⁰ DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom of Speech in Russia: Politics and Media from Gorbachev to Putin*, London, Routledge, 2017, p. 132.

¹¹ MICHAEL J. BAZYLER and EUGENE SADOVOY, *Television and the Law...*, p. 294.

¹² To directly view the television material to write this article, the Gosteleradio archive was used (I refer to the official YouTube Channel of the Gosteleradio Archive: «Советское телевидение. ГОСТЕЛЕРАДИОФОНД», <https://www.youtube.com/c/gtrftv/featured>). The Archive is completely free and open access; it contains nearly twenty thousand videos of countless Soviet television programs, including precisely *Prozhektor perestroiki*. The channel has more than three million subscribers and more than one billion views; it is an invaluable source for anyone who wants to study the history of Soviet television.

Prozhektor perestroiki was launched on August 3, 1987, and was intended to air immediately after *Vremya*, as an afterword that would add ten to fifteen minutes to the news program. As the name suggests, the purpose of the program was to investigate how the implementation of reforms was progressing, often going into the streets to interview ordinary citizens for real and honest opinions. The program immediately became very popular, as for the first time Soviet citizens felt they were at the center of something, for the first time their opinions were not only heard by someone, but even discussed on television.

The daily *Izvestia* wrote: «It is hard to recall another Central Television program that arouses such great interest», as Aleksandr Krutov, the historic presenter of *Prozhektor perestroiki*, recalled in the magazine *Russkii Dom* («Russian Home») of which he is still editor-in-chief.¹³

The program was conceived by Leonid Kravchenko, deputy chairman of Gosteleradio from 1985 to 1988 and then chairman from 1990 to 1991) and the Alexander Yakovlev, a close collaborator of Gorbachev who was called the «architect of perestroika».¹⁴ In his autobiography¹⁵ Kravchenko recounts a number of episodes in which *Prozhektor perestroiki* succeeded in solving important problems for citizens literally in a matter of hours; problems that in the Soviet Union of previous years would probably have lasted weeks or months.

For example once, Kravchenko recalls, trucks delivering fruits and vegetables blocked traffic near Ostankino, demanding a meeting with Russian television executives. Kravchenko went in person to talk to the truckers and discovered that some vegetable warehouses had been demanding bribes for about a week and were not allowing drivers to unload tons of produce. The truckers asked Kravchenko to organize an episode of *Prozhektor perestroiki* right then and there to bring this issue to the attention of the public. Kravchenko agreed, but while he was arranging it, he received a phone call from Viktor Grishin, an important member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and historic First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee. Grishin had already heard the news and wanted to prevent the issue from being aired in prime time on one of the most watched programs in the

¹³ ALEKSANDR KRUTOV, *O žizni, o sebe* («On Life, On Myself»), *Russkii Dom*, <http://www.russdom.ru/node/27>.

¹⁴ DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom...*, p. 117.

¹⁵ LEONID KRAVCHENKO, *Kak ya byl televizionnym kamikadze*, «Как я был телевизионным камикадзе», Moscow, AiF Print, 2005. The book is published only in Russian.

country. «Comrade Kravchenko», Grishin said sternly over the phone, «I have ordered that all these trucks be unloaded immediately at the nearest vegetable stores. In two hours the problem will be solved. The blackmailing bureaucrats will be punished severely. But please, let us dispense with *Prozhektor perestroiki*». The program still aired showing the truck drivers, but it was also shown how Grishin quickly solved the problem.

This is only one of a great many examples that could be given to demonstrate the importance of a television program such as *Prozhektor perestroiki*, which was created to analyze change and became its driving force and stimulus.

Another issue that was investigated by the show was the widespread scarcity of newspapers in the Soviet Union.¹⁶ As reforms and unprecedented freedom of speech were consolidated, demand for newspapers and magazines increased exponentially, far outstripping a supply caught unprepared. Many citizens accused the authority of artificially creating this shortage of newspapers, in order to limit the circulation of the excessively radical new publications; *Prozhektor perestroiki* thus decided to investigate the matter.

A reporter from the tv program went to a Moscow newsstand at six in the morning; there was already a long line of people waiting to buy a copy of a newspaper. The vendor stated to the broadcast microphones that usually by eight o'clock in the morning he had already sold all the newspapers. After showing the problem, following the usual procedure of investigation, *Prozhektor perestroiki* journalists would go and ask for explanations from those in charge, pointing out the issue. In this case they went to the chairman of the Goskomizdat¹⁷ Mikhail Fedorovich Nenashev. From the interview with Nenashev it turned out that the real problem behind the lack of newspapers was the technological backwardness of the printing industry. «We have about 79,000 printing presses, 46 percent of which are fifteen years old», Nenashev told the microphones of *Prozhektor perestroiki*, «the technology installed fifteen or twenty years ago is obsolete and requires complete replacement. But the saddest thing of all is that nowhere in this country do we produce this equipment».¹⁸

¹⁶ *Prozhektor perestroiki*, March 1, 1988.

¹⁷ Государственный комитет Совета министров СССР по делам издательств, полиграфии и книжной торговли (State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Publishing, Printing and Book Trade).

¹⁸ BRIAN MCNAIR, *Glasnost...*, p. 49.

The fact that a television program could freely investigate the problems of ordinary citizens and go to the officials dealing with them and hold them to account, urging speedy and functional solutions, was already something revolutionary in the Soviet Union.

3. *Case study: the Chernobyl disaster (analysis of the spreading of the news)*

Glasnost, little more than a month after its launch, was tremendously tested and suffered an immediate setback.

On the night of April 26, 1986, not even two months after the end of the XXVIIth Congress of the CPSU in which Gorbachev had officially initiated reforms, the fourth reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in RSS Ukraine, about 100km north of Kiev, failed causing the largest accident in the history of civilian nuclear power. What caused the disaster was a fatal interaction between a series of human errors and distractions and outdated technology dating back to the postwar period.¹⁹

Faced with this first and sudden test, the young glasnost gave way to the old culture of secrecy. The Politburo met in an extraordinary session. Yakovlev, who advocated fully informing the public, stated later that general bewilderment reigned in the meeting and «no one knew what to do».²⁰ Some information soon leaked out from the Western media. Sweden was the first to raise the alarm, reporting an abnormal radiation spike; the news spread throughout Western Europe but, in the absence of an official statement from the Soviet government, no one knew what had really happened.

For two days no Soviet media said anything about it, until the April 28 evening edition of *Vremya* announced, as the seventh news item and using just five sentences: «An accident has occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. One of the nuclear reactors has been damaged. Measures are being taken to eliminate the consequences of the accident. Help is being brought to the victims. A government commission has been established».²¹ Few words, no pictures, little importance: that was how Soviet television announced the disaster.²²

¹⁹ ANDREA GRAZIOSI, *L'Urss dal trionfo al degrado. Storia dell'Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2011, p. 528 and HANS MODROW, *La perestrojka e la fine della DDR*, Milano-Udine, Mimesis, 2019, p. 44.

²⁰ ANDREA GRAZIOSI, *L'Urss dal trionfo al degrado...*, p. 528.

²¹ *Vremya*, April 28, 1986.

²² ELLEN MICKIEWICZ, *Split Signals...*, p. 61.

Although made in such a frugal manner, the announcement of the Chernobyl accident was nonetheless a novelty for a journalism accustomed to completely omitting any negative news, and those five sentences delivered with indifference represented an initial breach in Soviet public information.²³ It was not until May 14, eighteen days after the disaster, that Gorbachev spoke to the nation, although much of the speech consisted of accusing the United States and the West of exaggerating the gravity of the situation in their media for anti-Soviet propaganda purposes.²⁴

To compare how the news was treated in the early days in the Soviet Union and in the West, it's useful and interesting to compare the Soviet news program *Vremya* with the Italian *TGI*²⁵ and the American *ABC News*.²⁶

It has been said how *Vremya* announced the news of the accident on the evening of April 28: in an atonal, anonymous voice, with a note of indifference and that superficial swiftness with which news of little consequence is usually reported. Instead, the Italian newscast opened with the following words: «The aftermath of the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union almost totally focuses the world's attention». It seems impossible that they were referring to the same event described so unimportantly by the Soviet news program. «It is a situation that is in many ways out of control», the Italian journalist continues, «especially because of this extreme scarcity of information provided by the Soviet authorities, with an attitude described as irresponsible by several countries». So, in Italy as in other countries aligned with the Atlantic bloc, the news was given marking the seriousness of the incident and blaming the Soviet government for the lack of comprehensive coverage of the news.

The American *ABC News* on April 28 opened with the following sentence: «A nuclear accident has occurred in the Soviet Union, and the Soviets have admitted that it happened». The Americans with this ironic-tinged opener wanted to announce that there were two important pieces of news: it was not only the accident itself that was news, but also the fact that the

²³ DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom...*, p. 118.

²⁴ The *Vremya* episode can be viewed in Russian and in its entirety in the *GOSTELERADIOFOND* archive at the following link <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Fe6f5poNOQ>. Instead, to see a cut and dubbed version in English, which aired on the U.S. *NBC News*, can be viewed at the following link <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0k3wnXBE5S0>.

²⁵ 1986 *TGI* episode about Chernobyl <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HLL8ZpeGV5s>.

²⁶ *ABC News*, April 28, 1986 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XmeeEpWxIRY>.

Soviets had mentioned it on *Vremya*. Subsequently, a translation of the Soviet version of events was reported by the presenter, and then insinuated that the Soviets had been so «quick» to report the news only because the exponential increase in radiation had been immediately recorded by some Scandinavian countries.

After showing some pictures, the American news program, in the full spirit of Cold War competition, proceeded to point out the difference between American and Soviet nuclear technology:

Most large Soviet plants are different in design from U.S. reactors. The main difference is that most Soviet nuclear plants do not have containment buildings (the thick concrete dome structure that Americans are used to seeing built around reactors). When the worst U.S. nuclear accident occurred at Three Mile Island, most of the radiation was retained within the containment building, unlike this Soviet accident where radiation was measured from six hundred to a thousand miles away.²⁷

At the conclusion of the report, it was remarked once again that if the Soviets themselves had spoken about it, it meant that the accident had been definitely serious: «Sources in Washington speculate that the accident at Chernobyl must have been very serious, otherwise the Soviets would never have acknowledged it».

ABC News also reported on Gorbachev's May 14 speech.²⁸ Again, the news report opened with a provocative sentence: «It took a full eighteen days for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to make a public statement on the Chernobyl nuclear disaster», and again a few seconds later, «It undoubtedly took a long time for Mr. Gorbachev to speak publicly about it». Later the U.S. news program reported about two minutes of Gorbachev's speech, dubbed into English by the commentator, and then concluded the report with yet another sentence with ironic-provocative overtones: «It was a speech designed to calm Soviet fears and end Western doubts about this country's [the Soviet Union's] ability to cope with a national disaster, but since the Kremlin leadership has taken more than two weeks to deal with the problem, it may be a long time before these two goals can be achieved».²⁹

²⁷ See note 36, minutes 2:32 - 3:00.

²⁸ *ABC News*, May 14, 1986, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0k3wnXBE5S0>.

²⁹ See note 28, minutes 2:51 - 3:07.

From the analysis of how these three news outlets reported information about the nuclear disaster, some conclusions can be drawn. The first is that in 1986 the political climate of the Cold War had far from waned; even in reporting tragic news like this, both superpowers indulged in more or less explicit attacks, accusations, and provocations. The second observation we can make is that, among the three, the most unbiased and balanced news program was undoubtedly the Italian one. *TGI* put the news and its consequences first and never directly attacked the Soviet Union, vaguely stating that the Kremlin's behavior was deemed irresponsible «by various countries».

Finally, it is important to note that despite the slowness and the difficulties, the mere fact that the disaster was reported by *Vremya* and addressed directly by the General Secretary was a huge step forward for Soviet information compared to previous decades. Chernobyl was undoubtedly a watershed for Soviet media.³⁰ Glasnost, a policy of openness and transparency that was being pioneered for the first time in those very months, suddenly found itself at the center of world attention. Chernobyl was the final blow that opened the breach in the Soviet media's wall of silence, media that would become unrecognizable within a few months.

4. *Radical glasnost and new unfiltered TV shows*

As glasnost spread, more and more innovative programs made their appearance on Soviet television. In addition to the already mentioned *Prozhektor perestroiki*, other important programs worth mentioning were *Dvenadsatyi etazh* («Двенадцатый этаж», Twelfth Floor), *Do i posle polunochi* («До и после полуночи», Before and After Midnight), *Pyatoe koleso* («Пятое колесо», literally The Fifth Wheel, but translatable as The Spare Wheel), *600 sekund* («600 секунд», 600 seconds) and the all-important *Vzglyad* («Взгляд», translatable as Look, Vision, Perspective, but also Point of View).

One of the earliest shows, aired as early as 1985, was *Dvenadsatyi etazh*, a program designed for the younger generation and named so precisely because the «General Editorial Office of Youth Programs»³¹ of the Central Television of the Soviet Union was located on the twelfth floor of the Television Center. The purpose of *Dvenadsatyi etazh* was to put

³⁰ ELLEN MICKIEWICZ, *Split Signals...*, p. 64.

³¹ Главная редакция программ для молодежи (Glavnaya redaktsiya programm dlya molodezhi).

the very young in direct contact with senior officials and public figures in Soviet politics. The presenter, Eduard Sagalaev, arranged the youth and the officials in two different rooms, joined by a satellite link. In fact, Sagalaev argued that arranging all the guests in the studio face to face would somehow inhibit the young people who would not feel free to fully express their thoughts; and he was probably right: proceeding in this manner often resulted in heated and intense generational clashes.

On May 23, 1987, *Pravda* wrote: «Central Television's programs for young people have recently gained particular popularity... The programs *Mir i molodezh* and *Dvenadtsati etazh* demonstrate an understanding of the great social challenges facing young people, help form in viewers a sense of responsibility for the Motherland, for its great history and culture». ³²

In March 1987, began the airing of *Do i posle polunochi*, a show created by Vladimir Molchanov that achieved immediate great success. The purpose of this program was the infotainment, a combination of information and entertainment. ³³ The show, in its opening theme song, called itself «informacionno-muzykal'noj», or informational-musical; in fact, Molchanov tried to combine interviews, news and politics with live youth music entertainment, and again, as in Sagalaev's show, the experiment was very successful. ³⁴

The program aired once a month, in the night between Saturday and Sunday, and was the stage for the live performance of many songs previously banned by Soviet censorship. In an interview with *Novaya Gazeta* in 2000, Molchanov explained why *Do i posle polunochi* was so successful:

When we went on the air for the first time on the night of March 7-8, 1987, we were the only ones. There was not a single program on Soviet television, with the exception of *Vremya*, which was broadcast live. And there was not a single program that talked about what we were talking about. Basically, it was easy for us. Since nothing else was being offered to the viewer, the whole country watched us. Then we realized that since we were the only ones, we had a chance to say what we wanted, what had

³² *Pravda*, May 23, 1987.

³³ DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom...*, p. 135.

³⁴ To watch episodes of *Do i posle polunochi*, one can consult the aforementioned *GOSTELERADIOFOND* and search (in cyrillic) for «До и после полуночи».

never been said on Soviet television.³⁵

To understand the extraordinary novelty of the topics covered by these new shows, we can take as an example the May 6, 1987 episode of *Do i posle polunochi*. The evening's topics were: the rehabilitation of Igor Severyanin, a futurist poet of the 1920s; an account of the Cannes Film Festival; a music video by the Soviet heavy-metal group Ariya; an interview with Grace Kennan, an American journalist and daughter of the George Kennan who had devised the «policy of containmen» toward the USSR at the dawn of the Cold War; an interview with Archbishop Pitirim about the availability of Bibles in the Union; and a debate with sociologist Igor Bestuzhev-Lada about Russian youth and their uncritical imitation of Western fashion.³⁶ Just two or three years earlier, all these topics would have been huge taboos and would never have been treated with such freedom on public television.

Before talking about *Vzglyad*, which according to some historians was the most-watched television show ever in the Soviet Union,³⁷ I think it appropriate to mention two regional programs, produced by Leningrad television.

Pyatoe koleso was a program created by the intelligentsia for the intelligentsia, conceived and presented by Bella Kurkova; it aired twice a week with very long episodes reaching up to three hours. Launched on April 11, 1988, it did not enjoy immediate popularity, but slowly managed to win an important segment of the audience, an intellectual audience interested in the historical, political, and cultural debates and interviews with writers and thinkers that the program offered.

The title, «The Fifth Wheel», was meant ironically to indicate its own superfluous nature, as the purpose of the program was to tell stories about people and ideals that had been considered superfluous by Soviet ideology;³⁸ not surprisingly, *Pyatoe koleso* was very successful even after the collapse of the Union, continuing to air until 1996.

³⁵ *Novaya Gazeta*, March 6, 2000 «Vladimir Molchanov: Diktatura v Rossii vozmozhna vseгда» («Владимир Молчанов: Диктатура в России возможна всегда»), the entire interview can be found at the following link: <https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2000/03/06/9543-vladimir-molchanov-diktatura-v-rossii-vozmozhna-vsegda>.

³⁶ *Do i posle polunochi*, May 6, 1987.

³⁷ DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom...*, p. 136.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

Another fortunate Leningrad television program was *600 sekund*, conceived and presented by Aleksandr Nevzorov. This show was very different from *Pyatoe koleso*; it was fast-paced and humorous and depicted the hidden life of Leningrad without filters. It seemed that *600 sekund* was designed as a parody of *Vremya*, having quick speeches, no protocol, and reporting only bad news. The host, Nevzorov, was also very different from typical Soviet news presenters: he wore a leather jacket and always had a wry, provocative smile plastered on his face. The program lasted, as the title implies, 600 seconds, ten minutes, and behind Nevzorov reporting the news was a television set on which a countdown from 600 to 0 was shown; the program played precisely on Nevzorov's race against time, who had to announce all the news before the 600 seconds expired.

The show soon became very popular, although it received some criticism for showing only negative, often gory news, but Nevzorov defended himself by claiming that he was reporting the unvarnished truth, not making anything up. Nevzorov made this bleak and violent reality his strong point, placing his program in that tradition of «magic realism» that characterized the Petersburg stories of Gogol and Dostoevsky; Nevzorov, in fact, referred to the humble citizens of Leningrad's dark corners in the Dostoevskian terms of «humiliated and insulted».³⁹

However, the most controversial and most famous show, which twisted Soviet citizens' perception of television, was *Vzglyad*.

Vzglyad was probably the television symbol of perestroika, and its impact on the politics and society of the time was incalculable.⁴⁰ The show aired, live, every Friday night starting at 11 p.m., continuing without a lineup and ending freely often well past midnight.

The first episode was broadcast on October 2, 1987⁴¹ and immediately the program described itself as «a weekly informative-musical-entertainment show for young people», later proving to be a huge success even among the less young. The show, which aired until 2001, had numerous hosts, but the first three, the most important and those who went down in history, were Vladislav List'ev, Dmitry Zakharov, and Aleksandr Ly-

³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 139.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 136.

⁴¹ The first episode of *Vzglyad* can be viewed in its entirety on *GOSTELERADIOFOND* at the following link <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AWPcU0rn4w8>.

ubimov.⁴² The three young presenters deliberately showed themselves as very unprofessional, dressed in Western-style t-shirts and jeans, wanting to mark the difference between them and old-fashioned television programs. Each of the three embodied a different personality: List'ev was the one who was always quiet and relaxed, Zakharov the serious one, and Lyubimov the outgoing and pop music expert.⁴³

The name of the show, *Vzglyad*, can be translated as «point of view», and this was precisely to signify, in the full spirit of perestroika, that the one brought by the program was only one point of view among many possible ones. *Vzglyad* was thus doing *infotainment* similar to *Do i posle polunochi* although, unlike Molchanov's show, it was less serious and much more mischievous in dealing with amusing scoops that often concerned Party officials or bureaucrats.⁴⁴ The two shows were often compared as the two symbols of perestroika television. Yevgeny Dodolev, one of the other presenters of *Vzglyad*, stated in a 2011 interview:

During the same period Vladimir Molchanov's show *Do i posle polunochi* was broadcast, an order of magnitude higher in terms of quality of content and conduct. It came out once a month, the time of the show (before and after midnight) was not the best... But *Vzglyad* had a one-to-four advantage! [Dodolev refers to the fact that *Do i posle polunochi* aired once a month, while *Vzglyad* once a week] So the show became, as they say now, a cult...⁴⁵

Vzglyad brought prime-time content that was often shocking to audiences; for example, it was the first program to talk about Soviet prisoners in Afghanistan, and it caused great scandal the April 21, 1989, episode in which Mark Zakharov, director of the Lenkom Theater in Moscow, argued on air that Lenin's body should be removed from the mausoleum and buried normally. Although Zakharov was not directly criticizing Lenin, this proposal was felt to be an affront and Gosteleradio director Aleksandr

⁴² Two other prominent *Vzglyad* hosts worth mentioning were Vladimir Mukusev and Aleksandr Politkovsky, husband of the famous journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who was killed in 2006 .

⁴³ DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom...*, p. 137.

⁴⁴ For example, *Vzglyad*'s team once waited at the airport for one of the most self-righteous commentators with anti-capitalist views in the Soviet Union to arrive and they surprised him with a suitcase full of Western products he had purchased during his trip abroad.

⁴⁵ LARISA Štejnman, «Evgenij Dodolev vsponimaet, kak peredacha *Vzglyad* izmenila otechestvennoe televidenie i ego samogo» («Evgenij Dodolev recalls how the *Vzglyad* program changed national television and himself»), *Svobodnaya Pressa*, May 21, 2011 (<https://svpressa.ru/society/article/43592/?f=1>).

Aksenov was forced to resign for allowing such a thing to be said on television.⁴⁶ Mikhail Nenashev, whom we mentioned a few pages ago as head of Goskomizdat, took his place.

The second half of the 1980s represented a golden age for Soviet television, and this was thanks to enterprising young men, such as Sagalaev, Molchanov, Nevzorov, and the entire cast of *Vzglyad*, who, with their innovative ideas, set out to revolutionize the way television was done in the Soviet Union, also thanks to the new freedom of expression. Soviet television was the real unstoppable force behind glasnost, and within months all the taboos that had plastered the Soviet media for decades were broken.

5. *Donahue, Pozner and the «Telemost» between the United States and the Soviet Union*

Among the purposes of perestroika was also to permanently avert the risk of nuclear war and somehow end the Cold War;⁴⁷ one of the best ways to implement this purpose was to decrease the distance between the Soviet and American populations.

Thus, a broadcast was devised in which a television studio in the United States and one in the Soviet Union were linked via satellite, each with its own host and its own audience. The Americans called the program *US-Soviet Space Bridge*, while the Soviets called it *Telemost* (literally «Television Bridge»). The purpose of this kind of show was to directly connect American citizens and Soviet citizens in an attempt to humanize what had been considered the enemy for decades.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ MICHAEL J. BAZYLER and EUGENE SADOVOY, *Television and the Law...*, p. 305.

⁴⁷ MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, *Perestrojka. Il nuovo pensiero per il nostro paese e per il mondo*, Milano, Mondadori, 1987, p. 342.

⁴⁸ DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom...*, p. 119.

The two historic Space Bridges hosts were Phil Donahue for the United States and Vladimir Pozner⁴⁹ for the Soviet Union.⁵⁰ The two became close friends, and in the 1990s they hosted a popular show together in the United States called «Pozner/Donahue».

The first *Telemost* was recorded on December 29, 1985 and aired on February 19, 1986 under the American title of «Citizens Summit I - Leningrad/Seattle» and Russian title of «Telemost Leningrad-Seattle». The total recording was over two hours, but the program aired cut, differently in the two countries. The American version lasted about 45 minutes (one hour including commercials), while the Soviet version consisted of 70 minutes (without interruptions).⁵¹ The two versions were not equal; Soviet TV eliminated many funny parts, giving the program a more serious slant.⁵² For example, a scene was cut in which an American spectator asked how much money Gorbachev made, causing a group laugh in the audience in the Leningrad theater. Another episode cut in the Soviet version was when an American soldier declared his opposition to the Vietnam War and called on the Soviet military to rebel against the war in Afghanistan. In the adaptation aired in the USSR, only the part criticizing the Vietnam War was left in, and the subsequent appeal was cut.⁵³

In the second *Telemost* («Citizens Summit II: Women to Women - Leningrad/Boston» in the American version) both audiences were composed entirely of American and Soviet women. The show was taped on June 29 and aired on July 17, 1986. This episode went down in history for the phrase *V SSSR seksa net* («B CCCP секса нет»), literally: *There is no sex in the Soviet Union*.⁵⁴ An American woman had asked Soviet women: «In our TV commercials, everything revolves around sex. Do you have such TV commercials?». On behalf of the Soviet women, Lyudmila Nikolaevna Ivanova replied: «We don't have sex, and we are totally against it»; the

⁴⁹ Vladimir Pozner was born in Paris in 1934 to a Russian father and a French mother. His parents separated shortly after his birth, and Vladimir grew up with his mother in New York City. He did not move to Moscow until 1952 where he attended university and graduated with a degree in biology. He began his career in the Soviet media in the 1960s and to this day is one of Russia's leading journalists. Thanks to his perfect knowledge of English, he has traveled the world giving lectures with the aim of bringing the Western world and the Russian world closer together, just as he intended to do with Space Bridges with Donahue in the 1980s.

⁵⁰ DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom...*, p. 119.

⁵¹ ELLEN MICKIEWICZ, *Split Signals...*, p. 43.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁵³ For a detailed analysis of the differences between the American and Soviet versions of the first *Telemost*, see ELLEN MICKIEWICZ, *Split Signals...*, pp. 40-50.

⁵⁴ DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom...*, p. 120.

woman meant to say «we don't have sex, we make love», as she stated in a later interview; shortly afterwards another woman in the audience attempted to correct the first and said «we have sex, but we don't have such advertisements», but by then the audience had erupted in collective laughter and the correction was not clearly pronounced into the microphone; thus, the distorted version of *V SSSR seksa net* went down in history.

The phrase *There is no sex in the Soviet Union* became a catchphrase in those years and was often used to refer to the hypocrisy and anti-sexuality of Soviet culture.⁵⁵

The Space-Bridges experience undoubtedly made a great contribution in bringing the populations of the two superpowers closer together, bringing face to face ordinary men and women who turned out to be more alike than they thought. The *Telemost* experience also permanently established Donahue and Pozner in the Olympus of American and Soviet journalistic and television media figures.

6. *Legislative measures of the summer of 1990*

In the summer of 1990, new laws went into effect that went on to institutionalize the major changes that glasnost had brought to the Soviet media world over the past four years.⁵⁶

On July 15, 1990, the «Decree of the President of the USSR on the Democratization and Development of Television and Radio Broadcasting in the Soviet Union» was issued by Gorbachev. The purpose of the Decree was to allow the establishment of a radio and television broadcasting completely independent from the control of the Party.⁵⁷ The Decree consisted of an introduction and five short articles, the first of which consisted only of a preamble to the next four.

Article Two was crucial in that, for the first time in Soviet history, it sanctioned the possibility of establishing private television stations, with extremely simple requirements: all that was needed was for the new tele-

⁵⁵ The first ever Soviet film containing an explicit sex scene was Vasili Pichul's *Little Vera*, released in 1988.

⁵⁶ According to some historians, the institutionalization of glasnost also sanctioned its end. In fact, by 1990 there was no longer talk of glasnost but of now-won freedom of speech and officially independent media. Instead, the term glasnost tended to refer to that gradual path, begun in 1986, that led to the 1990 legislative measures (see DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom...*, p. 152).

⁵⁷ For the full English text of the Decree, see Appendix 1 by MICHAEL J. BAZYLER and EUGENE SADOVOY, *Television and the Law...*, pp. 335-337.

vision centers to be registered with the public authority. However, this simple bureaucratic requirement concealed a much more complicated practical one: private funds had to be used to set up and register a private television station, without any kind of public funding, and this was something very few could afford.

Article Three sanctioned that public television should also be organized independently of any political organization: «Monopolization of television space by either party, political current or group is inadmissible». This too was a first since, as we have seen, Soviet television prior to glasnost had always and exclusively played the role of amplifier for Party directives and propaganda.

Article Four provided for a reorganization of Gosteleradio «for the fullest and freest manifestation of the creative potential of its employees and the strengthening of democratic principles». The reorganization envisioned a move to a market system with profit possibilities and self-financing.

Finally, Article Five announced, as part of the conversion of the Soviet war industry to non-military purposes, that the new *Gelikon* and *Energia* satellite systems would be used to increase the number of television and radio channels across the entire Union.

This Presidential Decree was the first step toward the institutionalization of glasnost, but the big leap was made with the «Law on the Press and Other Mass Media»,⁵⁸ passed by the Supreme Soviet on June 12 and officially entered into force on August 2, 1990. Unlike the previous month's Decree, this law was the result of a long political discussion and was more specific in its articles. The Law consisted of thirty-nine articles and can be said to have officially sanctioned the end of censorship in the Soviet Union; its main goal was in fact to abolish *GLAVLIT*, the state body in charge of censorship in the country. I consider it appropriate, because of its revolutionary importance in the history of media and mass information in the Soviet Union, to quote Article One of this Law in full:

⁵⁸ For the full English text of the Act, see Appendix 2 by MICHAEL J. BAZYLER and EUGENE SADOVOY, *Television and the Law...*, pp. 338-349.

The press and other mass media are free.

Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are guaranteed for citizens by the Constitution of the USSR, consisting of the right to express opinions and beliefs, to seek, select, receive and disseminate information and ideas in any form, including the press and other mass media.

Censorship of mass information is not allowed.

The second article specified that mass media referred not only to the press but also to television and radio. With Article Three, the Law allowed local and regional television stations to broadcast in languages other than Russian, while Article Four, as already stated in the Presidential Decree, stipulated that each medium would have a separate legal identity, with the goal that the media would achieve their own economic self-sufficiency by following market laws.

The fifth article placed limits on the new freedom of expression, averting its abuse; it was forbidden to: publish information containing state secrets, incite violent change in the Soviet state system, propagate racial or religious violence and intolerance, broadcast pornographic material, incite criminal acts, and violate the privacy of individual citizens. In addition, Article Twenty-six allowed citizens to sue media outlets if false news was published about themselves, and the medium in question was obliged to publicly deny what had been previously published. This happened, for example, when Leningrad television accused Egor Ligachev of corruption and was sued by the latter for libel.⁵⁹

Another article that brought about a momentous change was Article Seven, which formalized the end of state, and thus CPSU, control over the media: «Monopolization of any mass media (press, radio, television, or other) is not permitted».

Articles Twenty-nine through Thirty-two went on to create the status of a «journalist», defining their powers, rights, and duties. In fact, until before glasnost, investigative journalism on a Western model did not exist in the Soviet Union, and so-called «journalists» were mere officials charged with reporting on Party directives.

⁵⁹ MICHAEL J. BAZYLER and EUGENE SADOVOY, *Television and the Law...*, p. 318.

Regarding foreign media, Article Thirty-three provided that Soviet citizens had the right to access information from foreign sources, including television and radio broadcasts and the press.

The Media Law of 1990 was a true Revolution and was the triumphant end point of the great ride that glasnost managed to take in just four years, starting from an uncertain beginning on the eve of Chernobyl accident and arriving at an institutionalization that included unprecedented liberalization, both in political and economic terms.

Against this backdrop, some television shows decided to turn into independent production companies. Among them was *Telekompanija VID*, also known as *VIDgital* or simply *VID*, founded by Vladislav List'ev and the other cast members of *Vzglyad* on September 30, 1990; the name *VID* is in fact an acronym that stands for *Vzglyad I Drugie* («Vzglyad and Others»). *VID* is still one of the leading television production groups in Russia and makes numerous programs for a variety of channels. Its logo, which consists of a CGI reconstruction of the mask of Chinese Taoist philosopher Guo Xiang, has become very famous.

7. *The authoritarian turn of 1991 and the «January Events» in Lithuania*

The positive situation that had emerged in those years regarding media liberalization took many steps backward in 1991, the *annus horribilis* for Gorbachev and his reforms. While glasnost had successfully brought the Soviet media to an unprecedented level of freedom, the economic reforms of perestroika were not yielding the hoped-for results; indeed, according to some historians, the General Secretary's main mistake was precisely that he focused more on political and democratic reforms than on economic ones, in contrast to what the Chinese Communist leadership was doing at the same time.⁶⁰

Citizens were becoming impoverished, consumer goods continued to be in short supply, increasingly strong centrifugal pushes were moving the republics of the Union towards independence, and support for Gorbachev's policies was diminishing. «The only thing that was accelerated», Hans Modrow argues, «was the instability of the economy and society as

⁶⁰ ENNIO DE SIMONE, *Storia economica. Dalla rivoluzione industriale alla rivoluzione informatica*, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2006, p. 309.

a whole. [...] There was a lack of stimulus at the social level, no tangible improvements in incomes and material well-being. Democracy alone was not enough».⁶¹

Gorbachev was in a middle position between Eltsin's radical liberal democrats and Ligachev's conservatives, and he understood that it was necessary to choose sides in order not to be caught between the hammer and the anvil. It was in this context that Mikhail Gorbachev's conservative turn, at the end of 1990, took place. The General Secretary entrusted key government and army posts to conservatives, prompting a quick reaction from Shevardnadze, who resigned as foreign minister on December 20, 1990, claiming that dictatorship was returning to the Soviet Union.⁶²

Gorbachev also aimed to regain total control of the media and personally fired Michail Nenashev as head of Gosteleradio, replacing him with loyalist Leonid Kravchenko, who as soon as he took office, on November 14, 1990, declared in no uncertain terms: «I have come to fulfill the will of the President».⁶³

On December 28, 1990, just five months after the enactment of the Media Law, censorship returned to the Soviet Union: Kravchenko banned the airing of *Vzglyad's* New Year's Eve episode, justifying the ban on the grounds that it was inappropriate to discuss the resignation of former minister Shevardnadze. On January 10, 1991, amid general anger and amazement, an order was then signed to indefinitely suspend the production and broadcasting of the show.⁶⁴ Thus *Vzglyad*, the television symbol of glasnost, had been officially censored by the authority.

But the point of no return was reached on January 13, 1991, in Vilnius, in the events that are remembered in Lithuania as *Sausio įvykiai* («January Events»). The Lithuanian RSS had declared its independence from the Soviet Union on March 11, 1990, and in the following months ethnic tensions between Lithuanians and Russians living in the country had escalated.

On January 8, 1991, the Lithuanian pro-Soviet *Jedinstvo* («Unity») movement organized a demonstration in front of the Supreme Council of Lithuania and attempted to storm the Parliament building. The next day

⁶¹ HANS MODROW, *La perestrojka...*, p. 175.

⁶² MICHAEL J. BAZYLER and EUGENE SADOVOY, *Television and the Law...*, p. 322.

⁶³ DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom...*, p. 154.

⁶⁴ MICHAEL J. BAZYLER and EUGENE SADOVOY, *Television and the Law...*, p. 323.

several Soviet military units entered Lithuania under the pretext of ensuring constitutional order. A series of actions by Soviet troops and minor clashes with civilians followed over the next few days, but it all culminated at 2 a.m. on January 13 when Soviet special troops stormed the Lithuanian national television center in Vilnius to prevent the broadcasts of a television station increasingly aligned in favor of Lithuanian independence.⁶⁵ This reconfirms the absolute centrality of mass media in the history of the Soviet Union's final years.

An unarmed crowd rushed around the Vilnius TV Tower to prevent it from being taken, but the Soviets began firing into the crowd, resulting in fourteen deaths and more than eight-hundred wounded. Images of the massacre went around the world, but nevertheless Vremya brought his viewers a different version: it was not Soviet troops who opened fire, but citizens outside the TV center on the orders of the president of Lithuania and Sąjūdis, the independence movement.⁶⁶

Aleksandr Nevzorov rushed to Vilnius to film a documentary, overtly pro-Soviet, about the events of those days. The film aired on the first channel of Central Television under the title *Nashi* («Ours»)⁶⁷. The documentary presented the Soviet troops as heroes who had protected the Russian-speaking population and restored order in Lithuania, and it was denied that they were responsible for the fourteen deaths. It came as a shock to many viewers to see Nevzorov openly siding with soldiers who had opened fire on civilians, and the journalist lost much of the popularity he had gained in previous years with his show *600 sekund*.

However, not all Soviet media reported the official Kremlin version. For example, the headline on the front page of *Moskovskiye Novosti* was «Bloody Sunday», and immediately below it was the statement of the newspaper's board of directors titled «The crime of a regime that doesn't want to leave the stage».⁶⁸

On January 16, Gorbachev attempted a desperate move and proposed to the Supreme Soviet to suspend the Media Law that had gone into effect the previous August, but failed. Meanwhile, Gosteleradio banned all news

⁶⁵ DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom...*, p. 155.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

⁶⁷ The documentary can be viewed in its entirety (in Russian) on Nevzorov's official YouTube channel at the following link <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFo-hbTGbPY&t=818s>.

⁶⁸ DAPHNE SKILLEN, *Freedom...*, p. 157.

programs from talking about the events in Vilnius, forcing them to present the official Party version. There were numerous popular protests, extolling Kravchenko's resignation and the airing of *Vzglyad*, which despite the ban continued to occasionally come out in videotapes personally produced by Aleksandr Politkovsky in his apartment.

Tatyana Mitkova, a reporter for TSN, a new television news program, refused to read the official Party version of the clashes in Lithuania. At that point, Gosteleradio Vice Chairman Petr Reshetov threatened: «If you don't read it, we will close TSN»; Mitkova replied: «Then bring in one of your reporters». And so it was done. Reading the news, according to the official Kremlin version, was a government spokesman.⁶⁹

From February 6, 1991, when Gorbachev announced a referendum for March 17 regarding the preservation of the Soviet Union, a huge and unusual one-way television propaganda campaign began in favor of Gorbachev's position, whose speeches were broadcast in their entirety. Thus, by early 1991, after five years of glasnost, Soviet television was back to broadcasting exclusively according to the precise wishes of the Kremlin. Eltsin, for his part, accused Kravchenko of denying him access to numerous television shows during the referendum campaign.⁷⁰

Having failed to suspend the Media Law, on February 8 Gorbachev issued a Presidential Decree that effectively abolished Gosteleradio, transforming it from a government commission to an autonomous state-owned company, which took the name «All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company»;⁷¹ at the head of the company Gorbachev confirmed Leonid Kravchenko. With this decree Gorbachev secured total control over the state media. In fact, the new organizational structure gave the chairman of the corporation far greater powers than the chairman of Gosteleradio: Kravchenko in his new position was no longer required to consult either the government or the Party and was personally answerable only to the President of the USSR, i.e., Gorbachev. The Decree of February 8, 1991 ended the media autonomy that had been institutionalized the previous summer and officially brought media control back into the hands of the Kremlin.

⁶⁹ The story is recounted in *Moskovskye Novosti* January 20, 1991.

⁷⁰ MICHAEL J. BAZYLER and EUGENE SADOVOY, *Television and the Law...*, p. 324.

⁷¹ For the full English text of the Decree, see Appendix 3 by MICHAEL J. BAZYLER and EUGENE SADOVOY, *Television and the Law...*, pp. 350-351.

The economic and political situation in the Soviet Union continued to worsen, and Gorbachev had realized that most of the media, especially the television ones, were openly siding with Eltsin's radical faction and using free speech to discredit the government and perestroika; therefore, the General Secretary opted for a conservative turn and by centralizing media power in his hands attempted to stifle the opposition. But by then glasnost had taken root everywhere and the Soviet population had never been so informed and aware, and thus this move by Gorbachev only further diminished his popularity.⁷²

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 330.

‘Dans l’intérêt de la Santé Publique de l’Empire’¹

**THE OTTOMAN CONSULS DURING THE CHOLERA
EPIDEMIC OF 1867**

Giorgio ENNAS

Franklin University Switzerland, Sorengo, Switzerland

ORCID ID: 0000-0001-8948-9823

gennas@fus.edu

Summary: This paper aims to reconstruct the inter-imperial and international management of the cholera epidemic in the Adriatic Sea during the summer of 1867, through Ottoman diplomatic sources. The main aim is to write a brief history of the fight against cholera in the 1860s from an Ottoman perspective. In this period, the imperial consular network played a pivotal role in monitoring the spread of epidemics between the Red and Black seas, and the eastern Mediterranean. In their diplomatic documents, the Ottoman consuls described and analysed the sanitary measures adopted in their territories and by other countries, such as the Kingdom of Italy, the Principality of Montenegro and Austria-Hungary. In doing so, they highlighted positive and negative outcomes and described their personal contribution to the containment of epidemics.

Keywords: *Adriatic; cholera; borders; consuls.*

[...] I have the great honour to once again asking the Captaincy’s highest authority [...] for the simplification of those sanitary regulations, which so exceptionally infringe the rights of the Ottoman Government at the present time; whose sanitary laws have not hitherto merited such a disadvantage with any other European Power.²

¹ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (from now onwards BOA), Hariciye Nezareti (from now onwards HR), İdare (from now onwards İD), 1459, 51, 2, d. 134/44, from the General Consul, Robert Efendi, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Safvet Pasha, 22nd July 1867, Corfu.

² BOA, HR, İD, 1459, 43, 2, annexed to 2884/49, note 2874, from the consul general in Dubrovnik, Persich Efendi, to Imperial-Royal Central Captaincy of Harbour and Maritime Sanitation of Dubrovnik, 26th April 1867. Doi: 10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023/ejoss_v02i2003

This article aims to reconstruct the inter-imperial and international management of the cholera epidemic in the Adriatic Sea during the summer of 1867 through Ottoman consular sources. In their dispatches, Ottoman consuls described their relationship and collaboration with foreign governments and analysed the sanitary measures adopted by other administrations, such as the Kingdom of Italy, the Principality of Montenegro, and Austria-Hungary. These documents show us how these diplomats monitored possible sanitary threats and discriminatory attitudes, and furthermore highlight their personal contributions to the containment of epidemics. In doing this, the Ottomans fought a double conflict: while the consuls tried to build solid sanitary barriers, they simultaneously faced the European neoquarantinism of the 1860s, interpreting it as another case of 'double standards' and discrimination of several states against Ottoman populations. Through the close reading of diplomatic sources, this article analyses the epidemic situation of the summer of 1867 in the Adriatic area from an Ottoman consular perspective.³

The first section briefly explains the nature of the Adriatic Sea as a porous maritime border separating Ottoman and European territories, characterised by its 'easy and discreet' routes. The second part summarises the early development of Balkan sanitary borders. In the third section, the issue of inequality between the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian authorities linked with the recognition of respective maritime bills of health is described. In the fourth section, the article discusses resistance against the spread of cholera and discrimination from the Great Powers, represented as a sort of 'Western Question' by the Ottoman consuls. Finally, the last section deals with the Ottoman attempts to design a possible solution to counter European interpretations of neoquarantinism and the end of the cholera epidemic of 1867.⁴

³ This article is part of a two-years project concerning the influence of pandemics on the development of national borders in the western Balkans in the 19th century funded by the 'Swiss Network for International Studies' (SNIS): <https://snis.ch/projects/study-aims-to-investigate-the-nature-scale-and-root-causes-of-missed-opportunities-for-the-detection-and-referral-of-vawg-in-primary-care-and-emergency-departments-in-tirana-albania-and-belo-horizon/>.

⁴ Referring to Baldwin's *Contagion and the State in Europe, 1830-1930*, in the introduction of their book, Trubeta, Promitzer and Weindling defined neo-quarantinism as '[...] an approach involving empirical evaluation of incubation times and using modern disinfection methods, bacteriological examinations and other preventive measures.' See Sevasti Trubeta, Christian Promitzer, Paul Weindling (eds), *Medicalising borders. Selection, containment and quarantine since 1800*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, p. 29, Kindle edition.

1. THE ADRIATIC MARITIME BORDER

Since the Ottoman conquest, the western Balkans and the Adriatic Sea became the borderlands between the sultan's memâlik-i mahrûse (Ottoman well-protected domains), the Italian Peninsula and central Europe. In 1770, the Empress Maria Theresa of Austria sanctioned the creation an inter-imperial boundary between the Austrian and the Ottoman empires which acted as a military and sanitary border.⁵ The creation of military-sanitary borders, intended to prevent both military invasions in addition to the spread of epidemics from the Ottoman territories, became increasingly popular, and marked an important precedent for the definition of future territorial borders in the Balkans.⁶

The progressive withdrawal of the plague from the European continent during the 18th century, the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the new nautical technologies and customary praxis, facilitated population movements between Mediterranean countries, especially in areas such as the coasts of the Adriatic. New practices such as tourism and labour migration were added to the traditional religious pilgrimages and trade routes of states, such as Austria, Italy and the Ottoman Empire. This freedom of movement rendered the inter-imperial military and sanitary cordon between the Austrian and Ottoman empires in part pointless. In fact, since the first cholera wave of 1817-24, sanitationists from the wealthiest European countries considered quarantinism as an 'unwarranted violation of individual freedom'.⁷ This early epidemic demonstrated the permeability of state borders and the necessity to adopt new measures, in particular related to sanitation and hygiene, to avoid the risk of contagion and possible economic losses. This proved especially true for the maritime border between the western and the eastern coasts of the Adriatic. Like the Red Sea area,⁸ this border region between the eastern and the western coasts was characterised by short maritime routes that were easily navigable,⁹ and by strict sanitary

⁵ Irina Marin, *Contested Frontiers in the Balkans. Ottoman and Habsburg Rivalries in Eastern Europe*, I.B. Tauris, London-New York, 2013, p. 34

⁶ Nûkhet Varlık, *Plague and Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean World. The Ottoman Experience, 1347-1600*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015.

⁷ Peter Baldwin, *Contagion and the State in Europe, 1830-1930*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 25.

⁸ Marco Lenci, *Eritrea e Yemen. Tensioni italo-turche nel mar Rosso 1885-1911*, [Eritrea and Yemen. Italo-Turkish tensions in the Red Sea 1885-1911] Milano, Franco Angeli, 1990, p. 15.

⁹ Fabrice Jesné, *La face cachée de l'empire. L'Italie et les Balkans, 1861-1915*, [The hidden face of the empire. Italy and the Balkans, 1861-1915], Rome, Ecole Française de Rome, 2021, p. 67.

measures including quarantines and lazarettos, which were used to stem the spread of disease through port cities.¹⁰ For this reason, since the end of the Middle Ages, Adriatic cities such as Venice and Dubrovnik have been at the forefront of the development of quarantine systems.¹¹ In the same way, from the 1830s onwards, the Adriatic maritime border became an even more important front in the prevention of the spread of cholera in Europe, due to its position and permeability.

The 1860s represented a turning point for the politics and history of this region. The influences of the Kingdom of Italy, Austria-Hungary, and the Russian Tsardom in this area favoured not only the rise of Pan Slavism and local nationalisms,¹² but also transformed the Adriatic Sea into a new inter-imperial 'maritime frontier' as well.¹³ The inter-imperial competition accelerated the process of transforming the western Balkans from a borderland into an inter-imperial border area characterised by modern state borders that were gradually negotiated and defined following conflict, congresses and diplomatic negotiations.¹⁴ These numerous national building processes and the resulting displacement of populations made the creation of new borders necessary, all of which occurred in the presence of block-houses, quarantines, and lazarettos. Simultaneously, the 1860s represented a turning point in the history of sanitary measures as well, due to the global 'neoquarantinist turn'. In general, in the first half of the 19th century, the Great Powers and their medical and diplomatic corps were divided, also internally, between quarantinists and sanitationists. In the case of epidemics, the former argued for the need to impose quarantine measures, to the detriment of economic growth. In contrast, the latter favoured the prevention of epidemics through the imposition of hygienic

¹⁰ Quarantines and lazarettos refer to measures and structures of ancient origin aimed at isolating with contagious diseases in order to prevent contagion. Baldwin, *Contagion* ..., p. 5.

¹¹ Zlata Balazina Tomic-Vesna Blazina, *Expelling the Plague: The Health Office and the Implementation of Quarantine in Dubrovnik, 1377-1533*, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2015.

¹² Giorgio Ennas (ed.), *Reports of Cesare Durando, Italian Vice-Consul in Sarajevo (1863-1867)*. "Accaparrarne gli animi per il nostro interesse" ["Captivating their minds for our interest"], Istanbul, The Isis Press, 2020 (from now onwards RCD), annexed 1 to 39, dispatch (from now onwards d.) 11024/65, n. 22, from the Italian vice-consul in Sarajevo, Cesare Durando, to the Italian minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfonso La Marmora, 27th June 1865, Sarajevo, pp. 94-101.

¹³ Jesné, *La face* ..., p. 61.

¹⁴ For a short survey of the literature see: Maria Baramova / Grigor Boykov / Ivan Parvev (eds.), *Bordering Early Modern Europe*, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz Verlag, 2015; Yavuz M. Hakan / Peter Sluglett (eds.), *War & Diplomacy. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin*, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 2011; Sabri Ateş, *The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands. Making a Boundary, 1843-1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015.

regulations,¹⁵ as a way to avoid possible economic losses. Between the end of the 1850s and the 1860s, both positions found partial agreement in the neoquarantinist approach, which aimed to replace all-out quarantines with medical inspections, disinfection and ‘clean bills of health’ for ships. From this perspective, inspections should replace or ‘at least moderate’ quarantines ‘by targeting efforts at those who were demonstrably sick, rather than at all travellers from an infected origin’.¹⁶ In the 1860s, a majority of the powers agreed on a general standardisation of sanitary practices and on the imposition of neoquarantinist measures.¹⁷ In particular, this ‘switch to neoquarantinism’ with a renovated emphasis ‘on inspection and disinfection’ is reflected by the ‘precautions taken at the borders’,¹⁸ where the construction of border structures, such as lazarettos and barracks, aimed not only at maintaining but also helping to define land and sea borders as well.¹⁹ This was particularly true in the Adriatic maritime and land borders, where their presence marked the property of territories and districts.

Finally, as of the 16th century another border existed in the Balkans. The persistence of cultural, hygienic and religious stereotypes nourished the image of the Ottoman populations as ‘fatalist’, ‘apathic’ and superstitious.²⁰ Between the 16th and the 18th centuries, this collection of images created a ‘cultural border’ between the two coasts of the Adriatic. In the 19th century, confirmed and strengthened by the decision of the Ottoman elites to adopt traditional quarantinist measures and by the reports of diplomats and consuls,²¹ these stereotypes contributed not only to the creation of dangerous ‘images of the other’ for Balkan populations, but to the strengthening of cultural borders between the Ottoman Balkans and the European states as well. From the point of view of Europeans, cholera mainly affected ‘Asian’ countries more than their own countries, which were characterised by ‘greater freedom, wealth and civilisation’.²²

¹⁵ Baldwin, *Contagion* ..., p. 142.

¹⁶ Baldwin, *Contagion* ..., p. 151.

¹⁷ Baldwin, *Contagion* ..., p. 155.

¹⁸ Baldwin, *Contagion* ..., p. 159.

¹⁹ Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (from now onwards CADN), 623PO/1/1-2, Registre de la Correspondance officielle avec le Département et l’Ambassade à Constantinople, d. 97, from the consul general, Alphonse Rousseau, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Édouard Drouyn de Lhuys, 20th Mars 1866, Sarajevo, pp. 151-152.

²⁰ Nükhet Varlık, *Plague and Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean World. The Ottoman Experience, 1347-1600*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 81.

²¹ Jesné, *La face* ..., pp. 145-150.

²² Baldwin, *Contagion* ..., p. 25.

2. BALKAN SANITARY BORDERS

In the 19th century, the observation of epidemics in foreign territories became one of the main duties of European consuls.²³ Since the 1830s, diplomats from Great Britain, the Second French Empire, the Kingdom of Sardinia-Italy and other countries became observers of epidemic situations and supporters of quarantinist or sanitationist measures, in their efforts to limit the spread of epizootic outbreaks, cholera, plague and other diseases in European territories. From this point of view, the Ottoman 'modern' consular network adapted itself to this sanitary standard. Even if they were not experts of medicine or hygiene, ambassadors and consuls had a basic knowledge of the main sanitationist, quarantinist and neo-quarantinist theories.²⁴ In this way, they were able to: describe and analyse sanitary measures adopted by local administrations; suggest and support possible measures; and lastly, collaborate with provincial administrations and foreign governments in promoting their adoption among commercial traders and local populations. This happened not only in port-cities that were vital for Mediterranean commerce, such as Malta and Dubrovnik, but also in the case of entire provincial administrations, such as in the cases of Ottoman Bosnia-Herzegovina and Austrian Dalmatia.

Between the first and the second cholera global pandemics of 1817-24 and 1829-51, Sultan Mahmut II, his successors, and their pashas promoted the creation of a permanent sanitary system and the adoption of modern sanitary measures to prevent the spread of epidemics in the Ottoman territories and in the eastern Mediterranean.²⁵ The *Karantina Meclisi*, or Ottoman Quarantine Board, founded in this period, immediately became a fundamental sanitary institution, even if it was essentially a 'foreign-dominated [b]oard of Health' and a 'capitulatory branch of the Foreign Ministry'.²⁶ This representation of the *Karantina Meclisi* as an emanation of

²³ Fabrice Jesné, Normes et pratiques de l'information consulaire. Le consulat de Sardaigne à Smyrne (1857-1861), [Norms and practices of consular information. The Sardinian Consulate in Smyrna (1857-1861)], in Silvia Marzagalli / Maria Ghazali / and Christian Windler (eds.), Les consuls en Méditerranée, agents d'information: XVIe-XXe siècle, [Consuls in the Mediterranean, agents of information: 16th-20th century], Paris, Classiques Garnier, 2015, pp. 273-279.

²⁴ Archivio Storico-Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (from now onwards ASDMAE), Moscati VI (from now onwards M. VI), Folder 915, d. 50, from the consul general, Eugenio Durio, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Giacomo Durando, 12th August 1862, Shkodër.

²⁵ Birsen Bulmuş, Plague, Quarantines and Geopolitics in the Ottoman Empire, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2012, p. 98.

²⁶ Michael C. Low, Imperial Mecca. Ottoman Arabia and the Indian Ocean Hajj, New York, Columbia University Press, 2020, p. 131.

the capitulations system is related to the important influence that foreign delegates, such as the French Doctor Sulpice Antoine Fauvel or the Italian Doctor Barozzi had on the elaboration of its sanitary policies and decisions.²⁷ Nevertheless, the *Hariciye Nezâreti*, or Ottoman ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the imperial diplomatic and consular networks, played an independent and fundamental role in the promotion and adoption of sanitary measures, the monitoring of epidemics between the Black and Red seas and the eastern Mediterranean area, and, finally, the development of an international standard to avoid the spread of epidemics.

In particular, the imperial government, in that moment led by Mehmet Emin Âli Pasha and Keçecizade Mehmet Fuat Pasha, in agreement with the French government of Napoleon III, organised the reunion of the Third International Sanitary Conference of 1866 in Constantinople. For the Ottoman government, this conference aimed ‘[...] to deliberate on the desirability of setting up in Jeddah and Suez sanitary administrations with an international character to supervise the arrival and return of pilgrims from Mecca and to take necessary measures [...]’.²⁸ The conference in Constantinople sanctioned not only an international standard for sanitary measures, but the principle of international collaboration to prevent the spread of contagion in Europe as well.²⁹ From this point of view, the Sublime Porte aimed to share with France ‘[t]he merit of having rendered to humanity a service of this nature’ and actively contributed to the inter-imperial and international collaboration that had been ongoing since the wave of cholera in the summer of 1867.

However, despite the creation of the *Karantina Meclisi* and the Ottoman government’s active collaboration in the organisation of the Conference which showed its desire to be included in the European preventive system against epidemics, during the 1860s the European governments still demonstrated scepticism towards the real sanitary efforts of the imperial government. This scepticism was due to the tendency of the Ottoman political, diplomatic and medical elites to adopt the traditional quarantinist doc-

²⁷ Özgür Yılmaz, *An Italian Physician in the Caucasian Migration of 1864: the Mission of Dr. Barozzi in Trabzon and Samsun*, in “Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi”, [Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies], vol. XIV, n. 28, Spring 2014, pp. 5-44.

²⁸ BOA, HR, İD, 1526, 13, 1, d. 2237/401, from the ambassador, Safvet Pasha, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Emin Âli Pasha, 13th October 1865, Paris.

²⁹ Patric Zylberman, *Civilizing the State: Borders, Weak States and International Health in Modern Europe*, in Alison Bashford (ed.), *Medicine at the Border. Disease, Globalization and Security, 1850 to the Present*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2014, pp. 34-35.

trine,³⁰ due to the 'geographical location and consequent exposure to cholera' of the Empire. By the 1860s, this approach was considered by many European experts of epidemics as an example of 'scientific superstition'.³¹ In turn, this alternative approach fed into persistent stereotypes concerning the obstinacy, fatalism, and poor hygiene of the peoples of the Empire taken up by European doctors, ambassadors and consuls. In the consular diplomatic documents related to health, the political use and denigration of the other's sanitary measures emerges as an established practice, especially towards the Ottomans. This opportunistic aspect of consular activities is suggested for example in the dispatches of the Italian Vice-Consul Cesare Durando. From Sarajevo, Durando denounced the ineffectiveness of the sanitary cordons taken by both the Austrian and Ottoman authorities between Ottoman Bosnia and Austrian Dalmatia.³² Nevertheless, in the light of comparison with French and Ottoman documents, the idea that Austrian and Ottoman authorities were disinterested in the management of epidemic emergencies turns out to be false, or, at least, nourished by stereotypes and tainted by a desire to delegitimise local imperial governments in favour of the spread of Italian influence in the area.³³ In this way, the consuls aimed not only to strengthen the cultural border between them and their rivals in the Balkans, but between the Italians and the Balkan populations as well.

Similarly, as emerged in 1867, Ottoman elites and consuls often considered European neoquarantinist measures not only to be less effective than their own, but also as a threat to imperial populations given their limited efficacy. Simultaneously, European scepticism regarding the Ottoman commitment to eradicate cholera, and the European abnegation of traditional quarantinist techniques strengthened, on the one hand, the stereotype of the Ottomans as fatalists with poor hygiene standard,³⁴ or even plague-ridden,³⁵ and, on the other hand, reinforced the ancient cultural border between the 'healthy Europeans' and the 'infected others', to the

³⁰ Baldwin, *Contagion* ..., p. 212.

³¹ CADN, FRMAEE 166 PO/E, Box (from now onwards b.) 465, Report (from now onwards r.) 217, from the French delegate ad interim at the Sanitary Board of Constantinople, Dr. Barozzi, to the ambassador, Marquis Lionel de Moustier, 18th July 1865, Constantinople.

³² RCD, 14, d. 19168/63, 2, from the vice-consul, Cesare Durando, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Emilio Visconti-Venosta, 28th November 1863, Sarajevo, p. 43.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Giorgio Ennas, "*Non una di queste proposte fu messa in esecuzione*". ["Not one of these proposals was implemented"] *Sarajevo and the Cholera Epidemic of 1866*, in "RiMe", Idamaria Fusco / Gaetano Sabatini (eds.), *The Fine Thread of Emergency: Control, Restrictions and Consent*, n. 9/III n.s., December 2021, pp. 275-293.

³⁵ Varlık, *Plague*..., pp. 80-87.

detriment of Ottoman populations. For this reason, the Ottoman consuls had not only the task of collaborating with local authorities and imperial governors to monitor the spread of epidemics for the *Hariciye Nezâreti*, but also to protect the Ottoman economy and its people from discrimination and to demonstrate and defend the effectiveness of the quarantinist measures taken by imperial administration.

3. OTTOMAN BILLS OF HEALTH: A MATTER OF INEQUALITY

As a border city-port between Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian territories,³⁶ in choleric periods Dubrovnik imposed strict quarantinist regimes on arrivals from the eastern Mediterranean. In 1851, even if interested in British hygienism, the Austrians did not show any intention of abandoning their quarantine system against plagues coming from Ottoman territories.³⁷ Despite having regular documentation from Constantinople, the local captaincy often forced Ottoman ships to quarantine and to clean up their interiors. For this reason, it is not very surprising that, in April 1867, the Ottoman consul general in Dubrovnik, M. Persich Efendi, informed the *Hariciye Nezâreti* of an incident occurred to the Ottoman brigantine named '*Fiammalità*'.³⁸ Although his captain was in possession of an Ottoman '*patente sanitaria*' or 'bill of health' granted by the 'Health Directorate of Constantinople', guaranteeing its healthiness, the brigantine was blocked by the Austrian Captaincy of Dubrovnik and obliged to undergo a 24-hours quarantine. Persich Efendi wrote that this incident occurred because it did not carry a certificate from any other European power. In his note to the Captaincy, the Ottoman consul attributed this regrettable situation to an old disposition, which 'strikes so severely' the Sublime Porte in its 'dignity', 'self-respect', and commercial interests and, in general, was a matter of inequality between European and Ottoman bills of health.³⁹ In fact, Persich Efendi reported that the Austro-Hungarian government often repeated this mistake. It did not recognise the Ottoman 'clean' bills of health, because it did 'not yet believe that it can admit the Ottoman [E]mpire for a [p]ower that would be part of the European consortium.' The

³⁶ Baldwin, *Contagion* ..., p. 119.

³⁷ Baldwin, *Contagion* ..., p. 213.

³⁸ BOA, HR, İD, 1459, 43, 1, d. 2884/49, from the consul general, Persich Efendi, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 29th April 1867, Dubrovnik.

³⁹ BOA, HR, İD, 1459, 43, 2, annexed to 2884/49, note 2874, from the consul general, Persich Efendi, to Imperial-Royal Central Captaincy of Harbour and Maritime Sanitation of Dubrovnik, 26th April 1867, Dubrovnik.

same situation repeated 'for the same reasons' in the case of the landings of several Albanian brigantines. Therefore, rather than harm the rights of the Ottoman government, 'whose sanitary laws d[id] not as yet merit so much disfavour from any other European [p]ower', Persich Efendi suggested to the Austrian Captaincy to adopt other expedients to guarantee sanitary security, such as the use of telegraphs, 'by means of which one can be notified of the appearance of epidemics and contagious diseases' from any part of the world. In his opinion, in an epoch of such progress, it was not positive being so strictly attached to old sanitary doctrines, or in this particular case, quarantinism. The use of technology was 'perfectly' capable of overcoming any traditional health regulations. The Austrian Captaincy answered that this was the procedure and that any other vessel 'of whatever nationality, even Austrian', that presented itself with an Ottoman bill of health and 'without a [c]onsular certificate' would be subject to the same sanitary measures. For Persich Efendi, this was 'a clear contradiction' because, despite the adoption by the *Karantina Meclisi* of the sanitary measures in force in other European countries, the old law 'that an Ottoman [bill of health] should not be relied upon if the vessel is not accompanied by a European [c]onsular certificate' was maintained.⁴⁰ In this particular case, an Ottoman consul, closer to neoquarantinist positions than to traditional quarantinist ones, blamed a European power for imposing strict quarantinist measures against arrivals from the Ottoman territories. He preferred to underscore the matter of inequality of these dispositions. Highlighting the paradox of the non-acceptance of Ottoman licences by the Austro-Hungarian sanitary authorities, which effectively placed the Ottoman Empire outside European sanitary borders, Persich Efendi underscored the *de facto* persistence of an inter-imperial cultural and sanitary border, not only between Albania and Dalmatia, but between the Ottoman Empire and Europe as well.

4. A WESTERN SANITARY QUESTION?

Despite the persistence of these cultural and sanitary boundaries in the western Balkans, in May cholera appeared in the Adriatic maritime area between southern Italy and Montenegro.⁴¹ Seemingly strong supporters of

⁴⁰ BOA, HR, İD, 1459, 43, 4, d. 2968/64, from the consul general, Persich Efendi, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 10th June 1867, Dubrovnik.

⁴¹ BOA, HR, İD, 1459, 46, 1, d. 101/30, from the consul general, Louis Robert, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 27th May 1867, Corfu.

quarantinism, the Ottoman consul general in Corfu, Louis Robert, and the minister in Athens, Yanko Photiades Bey, informed the imperial government that cholera had appeared in Bari, Barletta and, probably, in Montenegro as well. The Kingdom of Greece adopted strict quarantinism as sanitary doctrine for many years, because of ‘their primary commercial ties’ with the Ottomans which forced them to ‘mirror Ottoman prophylactic practice’.⁴² Therefore, it is not surprising that, despite some contradictory rumours, in June the Greek government imposed a quarantine on arrivals from Tunis, Manfredonia, Barletta, Molfetta, Bari, Palma, Licata and Girgenti, due to the occurrence of some cases of cholera.⁴³ In July, the Greek measures were extended with regard to arrivals from Tunisia and the entire Italian Peninsula, which, from that moment, were considered ‘choleric countries’.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, cholera continued to spread across the Mediterranean islands and the western Balkans. In the area between the Balkan coast and the Adriatic islands, an Austro-Hungarian steamer brought rumours that cholera has broken out in Montenegro as well. The rumours were confirmed several days later. For this reason, Robert Efendi informed the *Nâzır* ad interim Safvet Mehmet Esat Pasha that the Greek sanitary office of Corfu had also quarantined vessels originating from Bar, Durrës, Avlona, Palermo and Saranda, because these ports admitted ships ‘*en libre pratique*’, or ‘freely and without restriction’, in addition to the Austrian steamers coming from the scales of Kotor and Dubrovnik,⁴⁵ and which brought communication from Montenegro.⁴⁶ Through the insular city-ports, cholera continued spreading from the western to the eastern coast of the Adriatic, the Ionian Islands, Malta and North Africa. On the island of Malta, although the British administration decided to subject arrivals from Sicily, Calabria, Naples, the Roman States, and those from the coasts and the provinces of Tunisia and Algeria⁴⁷ to a thirty-day quarantine, cholera still arrived. As a strong supporter of quarantinism, the Ottoman consul general in Malta, Naoum Duhany, feared that contagion would spread anyway throughout Valletta due to the ‘proximity of the [I]azarettos

⁴² Baldwin, *Contagion* ..., p. 205.

⁴³ BOA, HR, İD, 1459, 48, 1, d. 3124/179, from the consul general, Photiades Bey, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 19th June 1867, Athens.

⁴⁴ BOA, HR, İD, 48, 5, d. 19657/92, from the minister of Foreign Affairs, Safvet Pasha, to the consul general, Photiades Bey, 10th July 1867, Constantinople.

⁴⁵ BOA, HR, İD, 51, 1, d. 126/42, from the consul general, Louis Robert, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Safvet Pasha, 8th July 1867, Corfu.

⁴⁶ BOA, HR, İD, 50, 3, d. 120/39, from the consul general, Louis Robert, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Safvet Pasha, 1st July 1867, Corfu.

⁴⁷ BOA, HR, İD, 53, 2, Notification of the principal secretary of Malta, Victor Houlton, 6th July 1867, Valletta.

to the agglomeration of a large number of passengers' and the 'relaxation' of the British quarantine measures.⁴⁸

Meanwhile, on the mainland, cholera grew in Montenegro, in several villages of the Ottoman district of Trebinje, close to the Austro-Ottoman border, and in the Austrian district of Dubrovnik, 'where this plague has been imported'.⁴⁹ This situation alarmed the local population and the Austrian municipality adopted some 'restrictions on trade' towards Ottoman subjects and products. These strict quarantinist measures deeply concerned Persich Efendi because of the possible risks it posed to the economic and sanitary situation of the populations of Trebinje. Therefore, he immediately contacted the Austrian authorities of Dubrovnik in an effort to 'reconcile what is compatible in terms of sanitary measures with the vital requirements of reciprocal trade and traffic'.

Observing the rapid spread of the contagion and the difficulties of the British, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian authorities in preventing its spread through neoquarantinist measures, the Ottomans began to fear the spread of cholera from Montenegrin and Austro-Hungarian districts and ports. For this reason, the Porte started to consider the possibility of imposing more rigid quarantinist measures to prevent the arrival of cholera in its territories. Robert Efendi contacted the military governor of Janina to order the Ottoman sanitary authorities on the Adriatic coast to not admit 'in free practice' the vessels originating from Montenegro, Dubrovnik, Kotor and all those foreign centres infected by cholera. He reported also rumours regarding the possibility that soon the whole of Herzegovina would be invaded by the epidemic. To avoid this eventuality, the *vali*, or Ottoman governor, of Shkodër and the Sanitary Office of Kotor imposed a sanitary cordon of fifteen days on arrivals from Montenegro. Simultaneously, the Austrian authorities of Dubrovnik quarantined arrivals from Herzegovina and border villages impacted by the disease.

⁴⁸ BOA, HR, İD, 52, 1, d. 639/32, from the consul general, Naoum Duhany, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Safvet Pasha, 9th July 1867, Malta.

⁴⁹ BOA, HR, İD, 49, 1, d. 2993/73, from the consul general, Persich Efendi, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 24th June 1867, Dubrovnik.

In the middle of July, Robert Efendi, considering his ‘duty’ and responsibility

to the ‘interest of the [p]ublic [h]ealth of the Empire’, reported an ulterior strengthening of the sanitary measures.⁵⁰ In Corfu, the Greek administration put all vessels from the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea into a five-days quarantine. Also, arrivals from Trieste were targeted with eleven days, due to reports of sporadic cases in the Austro-Hungarian city. For the same reasons, arrivals from Brindisi, Bari, Barletta were subject to eleven days and those from Ancona to five.

From Dubrovnik, at the end of July Persich Efendi wrote that, even if the urban centres and the most of the villages were still free from contagion, the epidemic continued in the Austrian and Ottoman districts of the western Balkans, especially in those of Kotor, Dubrovnik, Trebinje and Nikšić.⁵¹ Always attentive to the possible implications of the sanitary measures imposed by the Austro-Hungarian authorities, Persich Efendi described with deep concern the ‘onerous’ and ‘painful’ conditions for the Ottoman traders and ‘bordering subjects’. The caravans arriving from the imperial territories were limited to once a week. The Ottoman consul admitted that, in several cases, he deliberately ignored the sanitary requirements and permitted ‘special activity’ to guarantee Ottoman commercial rights against discrimination. In his opinion, the local population was ‘seized by an exaggerated fear’ of cholera. A fear that, for him, the local authority was ‘embarrassed to satisfy’. For this reason, he hoped that the situation would soon be resolved, restoring the ‘status quo ante’. Rather than being disappointed by this attitude, the Ottoman *Vali* of Sarajevo Topal Osman Pasha expressed his satisfaction to Persich Efendi for his efforts in favour of the populations of Trebinje against the ‘hindrances’ that the Austro-Hungarian authorities of Dubrovnik had established towards the Ottomans ‘in the form of sanitary measures’.⁵² In fact, despite his efforts against the cholera epidemic in Bosnia in the summer of 1866,⁵³ in

⁵⁰ BOA, HR, İD, 51, 2, d. 134/44, from the consul general, Robert Efendi, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Safvet Pasha, 22nd July 1867, Corfu.

⁵¹ BOA, HR, İD, 56, 1, d. 3053/90, from the consul general, Persich Efendi, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Safvet Pasha, 29th June 1867, Dubrovnik.

⁵² BOA, HR, İD, 56, 6, annexed to 3101/104, copy 469, from the governor general, Osman Pasha, to the consul general, Persich Efendi, 19/31st July 1867, Sarajevo.

⁵³ Giorgio Ennas, ‘*Confine sanitario o nazionale? L’influenza delle epidemie nell’emergere dei nazionalismi balcanici*’, [‘Health Boundary or National Boundary? The influence of epidemics in the emergence of Balkan nationalisms’] in Francesco Cutolo / Costanza Bonelli (eds.), “Farestoria” *Malattie e società. Esperienze, pratiche*,

his letter Osman Pasha described the measures targeting Ottoman subjects as simply 'useless' and 'exaggerated', considering that the same epidemic existed in the Austro-Hungarian Dalmatia as well. Despite this apparent scepticism concerning the effective utility of the quarantinist measures, the disease continued to rage in the Adriatic area throughout the entire summer of 1867. Some areas, such as Austro-Hungarian Dalmatia, Ottoman Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Principality of Montenegro and the Italian Peninsula seemed to be virulently affected by the disease, despite the measures of sanitation, quarantine, and different techniques adopted by respective governments. Italian port cities seemed to be particularly affected by the disease.⁵⁴

As a supposed supporter of neoquarantinism, the plenipotentiary minister in Florence, Rüstem Bey, warned the Porte about the difficult situation the ports on the Italian Peninsula.⁵⁵ Cholera raged with 'great intensity' in several provinces, especially in Sicily, and the Greek and British governments imposed quarantines on arrivals from the Peninsula. Even if in August the Ottoman consul in Messina reported that the Sicilian city was still in a satisfactory situation, many important coastal centres, such as Catania and Syracuse, were affected by cholera. At its worst point, the city of Palermo recorded 600 cases in one single day. In Rüstem Bey's opinion, the epidemic had spread from Palermo, whence it infected the main centres of the Italian western coast, in particular Naples, Rome, Livorno, Genoa and Milan. Numerous cases were also observed in the north of the Peninsula, especially in the cities of Lombardy, although they never reached the alarming proportions of the south, where the situation was critical. However, considering that ships departing from Italian ports were still provided with clean bills of health, Rüstem Bey suggested to the *Hariciye Nezâreti* that they adopt 'the usual hygienic precautions' on their arrival in Ottoman ports.

In September the choleric wave continued to spread in the area around the Adriatic. Naoum Efendi wrote that in Malta several cases manifested 'either in the city or in the [...] villages', following the arrival of the

rappresentazioni, [Disease and society. Experiences, practices, representations], vol. II, 2021, p. 44.

⁵⁴ BOA, HR, İD, 56, 6, d. 3239/223, from the consul general, Photiades Bey, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 14th August 1867, Athens.

⁵⁵ BOA, HR, İD, 1459, 61, 1, d. 5051/263, from the plenipotentiary minister, Rüstem Bey, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 15th August 1867, Florence.

steamship of the Royal Navy named ‘Hydra’.⁵⁶ In his opinion, the population of the island was not ‘sufficiently alarmed’ and as such were invited to adopt ‘rigorous prophylactic measures’. Moreover, like in the Italian case, the local government decided to continue to provide clean bills of health, even though the contagion was still present on the island. Upon hearing this news, Naoum Efendi immediately telegraphed the *Hariciye Nezâreti* and the *vali* of Libya,⁵⁷ in order ‘to preserve our territory’, ordering the adoption of necessary measures to avoid the ‘invasion of an evil’, which, in that moment, was spreading in the Mediterranean, and, with particular virulence, between Italy, Malta, and the western coast of the Balkans. The Ottoman consul reported the opinion of the Maltase governorship and committee of Public Health, which confirmed that ‘a few cases of illness accompanied by cholera symptoms had been reported’, but that no epidemic had been declared and that clean bills of health for maritime vessels would still be issued. Therefore, Naoum Efendi confirmed his commitment to keep the imperial government informed regarding the ‘modifications that this disease can present as it continues its course.’ In fact, only a few days later, the Ottoman consul informed Fuat Pasha that some cases of cholera ‘followed by death’ had occurred, and as such he presumed that the Maltase bill of health had ultimately become ‘unclean’.⁵⁸

In the complex epidemiological picture described above, Ottoman consuls found themselves operating in a very delicate international situation. In this section, it has been possible to observe the difficult sanitary context in which Ottoman consuls worked during the epidemic of the summer of 1867. Moreover, it has highlighted how, on several occasions, the neo-quarantinist approach of European administrations, their taking advantage of norms and measures and their discrimination towards the Ottoman sanitary system were perceived as a serious issue by the imperial consuls. For this reason, they suggested the adoption of sanitary measures and the consequent strengthening of borders by imperial governors. In the second half of the 1860s, the issue of compliance with sanitary measures, such as the question of the bills of health, emerges as a decisive factor in the development of European and Ottoman sanitary systems. Although not always

⁵⁶ BOA, HR, İD, 1459, 67, 1, d. 672/43, from the consul general, Naoum Duhany, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 3rd September 1867, Malta.

⁵⁷ BOA, HR, İD, 1459, 67, 3, copy n. 667, annexed to d. 672/43, from the consul general, Naoum Duhany, to the governor, Patrick Grant, 2nd September 1867, Malta.

⁵⁸ BOA, HR, İD, 1459, 68, 1, d. 673/44, from the consul general, Naoum Duhany, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 10th September 1867, Malta.

working in agreement regarding the effective usefulness of sanitary measures, in general the Ottoman consuls highlighted what appears to be more a 'western sanitary question', linked, from time to time, to the adoption of neoquarantinism, the European double standard, and the European tendency to take advantage of states like the Ottoman Empire in such situations. From an Ottoman perspective, the European governments were generally represented as a potential threat not only for Ottoman public health, but also for the global public in general.

5. CONSULS AGAINST CHOLERA

Around the end of August, the Ottoman consuls thought about how to overcome the sanitary borders imposed by their European neighbours, in order to restore the freedom of movement of imperial subjects that had been strongly restricted by the cholera epidemic. When reporting the example of the Greek government, which imposed quarantine over all ships that had not previously submitted their bills of health for approval from the Greek consular authorities at their ports of departure, the Ottoman Consul General of the Cyclades Danish Efendi wrote that, in his opinion, this measure was 'respectful of the dignity of the foreign sanitary offices'. Therefore, he suggested that the disposition should be imitated by the imperial administration, by forcing 'Greek steamers and sailing ships [...] which leave Greece for any destination of the Empire' to request a visa from imperial consulates.⁵⁹ This measures would produce several important outcomes: it would reduce the frequency of the 'change of flag', used by Ottoman ships to avoid quarantines; it would guarantee regular revenues to Ottoman consuls; and finally, it would force each ship to present their manifestos to the authorities, thus facilitating more controls against criminal activities, such as smuggling.

From Malta, Naoum Efendi also took up the problem of the local sanitary measures and proposed a similar solution. In his opinion, the local government did not really believe 'in the usefulness of quarantines as a prophylactic measure'.⁶⁰ In fact, even if officially Valletta and its neighbourhood were safe, 'the germ of the disease has not yet completely disappeared' and

⁵⁹ BOA, HR, ID, 1459, 69, 1, d. 678/102, from the consul general, Danish Efendi, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 17th September 1867, Syros.

⁶⁰ BOA, HR, ID, 1460, 4, 1, d. 695/48, from the consul general, Naoum Duhany, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 29th October 1867, Malta.

some cases were still occurring in the villages. At that moment, ‘steamers’ and ‘sailing ships’ were no longer submitting their licenses to the consulate general, probably to avoid complications in Constantinople, whose authorities were stricter in the application of sanitary measures. Therefore, Naoum Efendi warned the *Hariciye Nâzırı* to alert the *Karantina Meclisi* in Constantinople and proposed a solution ‘for the safety of public health of our ports’.⁶¹ The Ottoman consul reported how the general administration of public health in France and Italy generally required the bills of health of foreign ships to be countersigned by the consulates of these powers ‘in the ports from which the departure of these ships takes place.’ For Naoum Efendi this measure would produce more satisfactory results with regard to public health, resulting in an increase in the revenues for the imperial consulates. In fact, the consulates of Austro-Hungary, Italy, Greece and Spain had a surplus of £ 2,000, an increase that would be entirely to the advantage of the imperial treasury.

The documents analysed so far have not clarified whether the Ottoman consuls’ proposal was taken into consideration by the imperial government. Apparently, the end of the epidemic emergency with the arrival of the autumnal season temporarily closed the issue, removing most of the sanitary measures and allowing the reopening of state borders to ships with Ottoman issued clean bills of health.

Since the end of August, Persich Efendi reported that the wave of cholera had begun to subside. In fact, even if in Herzegovina and Montenegro cholera was still ‘rampant’, the epidemic was finally decreasing in Trebinje and in Dubrovnik.⁶² Also the French Consul General in Sarajevo, Pierre Jules Moulin, declared that cholera was finally disappearing from Herzegovina.⁶³ In September, the last quarantines imposed in Greece on ships coming from Alexandria, Tarsus, and Latakia were suspended.⁶⁴ Gradually, strict quarantine measures were removed for arrivals originating from Dalmatia, Brindisi and the rest of the Italian littorals, replaced by pre-

⁶¹ BOA, HR, İD, 1460, 5, 3, d. 700/50, from the consul general, Naoum Duhany, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 5th November 1867, Malta.

⁶² BOA, HR, İD, 1459, 56, 5, d. 3101/104, from the consul general, Persich Efendi, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 28th August 1867, Dubrovnik.

⁶³ RCD, 68, d. 18742/67, from the consul general, Pierre Jules Moulin, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Pompeo di Campello, 29th August 1867, Sarajevo, pp. 154-155.

⁶⁴ BOA, HR, İD, 1459, 71, 1, d. 3314/252, from the consul general, Photiades Bey, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 18th September 1867, Athens.

cautionary five-days quarantines for observation and security.⁶⁵ At the beginning of November, the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian administrations suppressed the restrictive measures imposed on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia and Albania.⁶⁶ Arrivals from Dubrovnik and Trieste were readmitted 'in free circulation' and the sanitary situation of Constantinople was described as 'very satisfactory'. From Malta, Naoum Efendi also confirmed that the cholera epidemic had effectively ceased, confirming the 'futility' of programming further prophylactic measures.⁶⁷ Finally, between November and December, the Greek government also removed quarantines for arrivals from southern Italy and Algeria, if the ships had a clean bill of health endorsed by the Greek consular authority.⁶⁸

As pointed out by Peter Baldwin, for centuries the quarantinist measures of European states were 'based on mistrust' and 'inspired by fears of the Orient's sanitary state'.⁶⁹ During the First Sanitary Conference of 1851, the adoption of European hygienic and quarantinist measures persuaded several European and Ottoman observers that the cultural and 'sanitary' barriers between 'Orient and Occident' could mark the conclusion of this separation. However, the choleric waves of the 1860s highlighted the persistence of negative stereotypes and the durability of cultural and sanitary barriers. The above-mentioned discrimination against Ottoman measures, populations, and the modalities of application of neoquarantinist policies on vessels directed towards the imperial ports demonstrate this phenomenon. The cholera epidemic temporarily disappeared, the sanitary measures were dismissed, but the cultural and political sources of borders and barriers towards the Ottomans remained.

CONCLUSION

The Conference of 1866 promoted the adoption of a collaborative attitude in the face of disease, and a global standard for sanitary measures.

⁶⁵ BOA, HR, İD, 1460, 2, 1, d. 3376/271, from the consul general, Photiades Bey, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 16th October 1867, Athens; BOA, HR, İD, 1460, 3, 1, d. 3393/279, from the consul general, Photiades Bey, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 23rd October 1867, Athens.

⁶⁶ CADN, FRMAEE_166 PO/E, b. 465, r. 15, from the French delegate at the Sanitary Board of Constantinople, A. Marroin, to the ambassador, Nicolas Prosper Bourée, 6th November 1867, Constantinople.

⁶⁷ BOA, HR, İD, 1460, 4, 2, d. 708/55, from the consul general, Naoum Duhany, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 19th November 1867, Malta.

⁶⁸ BOA, HR, İD, 1460, 9, 1, d. 3467/301, from the consul general, Photiades Bey, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 27th November 1867, Athens; BOA, HR, İD, 1460, 12, 1, d. 3519/319, from the consul general, Photiades Bey, to the minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuat Pasha, 25th December 1867, Athens.

⁶⁹ Baldwin, *Contagion* ..., p. 228.

Analysis of the epidemic of 1867 however demonstrates a more complex reality. By the end of the decade, the relationship between European authorities and Ottoman consuls was characterised by a real desire of collaboration to limit the spread of cholera. More significantly though this relationship was characterised by the difficult interrelation between conflicting foreign policies, sanitary doctrines, and political and cultural stereotypes. The cases illustrated are particularly representative of the double standard perceived by the Ottoman consuls and which tended to persist among the Great Powers in the 1860s. In fact, during the epidemic of 1867, British, Austro-Hungarian and Italian sanitary boards still granted their ships clean bills of health, while Ottoman citizens and vessels suffered quarantines and blockades despite being in possession of Ottoman issued bills of health. At the same time, from this consideration it becomes clear that there was a fundamental difference between European and Ottoman consuls in epidemic contexts. In fact, while European consuls assisted the imperial authorities in their attempts to impose stringent sanitary measures and to promote the foreign policies of their respective countries, the Ottoman consuls were busy not only notifying their government and provincial administrations of the spread of the epidemic, but also had to do their best to avoid the spread of foreign influence and contagion from European ships in their ports. Simultaneously, they tried to unblock potential discriminatory and dangerous situations for the Ottoman state and its populations. Undoubtedly, this topic deserves further investigation, which will be addressed in future publications.

In conclusion, from this preliminary analysis, the important role of the Empire and of its consular network in the prevention of the spread of epidemics in Europe and in the Mediterranean clearly emerges. In general, although the Porte and the imperial consuls complained about the severe sanitary barriers and the discriminatory attitudes taken by certain European states, they continued to apply the measures they deemed necessary not only to preserve their own country, but the entire European continent as well.

Short bio: Giorgio Ennas is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Franklin University Switzerland in Lugano. He graduated with a Master of Arts in Languages and Civilisation of Asia and Mediterranean Africa from Ca' Foscari University in Venice. Between 2017 and 2021, he was a researcher at the European University Institute in Fiesole, where, under the supervision of

Lucy Riall and Pieter Judson, his work focused on the cultural aspects of diplomatic history of the Italian and Ottoman relations during the long nineteenth century. In June 2021, he successfully defended his dissertation entitled *'The Mediterranean Mirror. Italo-Ottoman Relations in an Age of Transition, 1856-1871'*. Among his publications are, the articles *'The Birth of the Ottoman Colonial Space. The Libyan Case (1835-1918)'* published in 2016, *'Connecting the Two Seas: Negotiating an International Modus Vivendi - Italian and Ottoman Diplomacies in the Suez-Red Sea Area'* published in 2022, and the book *'Reports of Cesare Durando Italian Vice-Consul in Sarajevo (1863-1867)'* published in 2020. Since November 2021, he has worked as the Principal Investigator (PI) of a two-year project entitled *'Pandemics and Borders. Pandemics as Driver towards Modern Borders and International Collaboration in 19th century Mediterranean and South Eastern European Periphery'* funded by the Swiss Network for International Studies (SNIS).

BULGARIA'S TURKISH MINORITY AND TURKEY-BULGARIA RELATIONS 1923-1939

Kerime Pinar ÖZKAN

Sapienza University of Rome

ORCID: 0000-0002-2133-7580

kerimepinar.ozkan@uniroma1.it

SUMMARY

This article aims to insight into the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria in regards to the issue of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in the period between 1923-1939. Indeed, from the establishment of the Republic of Turkey to the beginning of WWII, the most important issue in the relations between these two states was Bulgaria's Turkish minority. As a consequence of this, the living conditions of this community were clearly influenced by the political relationship between Ankara and Sofia. In this context, it is useful to investigate into how the Turkish minority's living conditions were affected by these two states in the interwar era by taking into consideration regional political conjuncture and social dynamics in this article.

Keywords: *Bulgaria, Turkey, Turkish minority, interwar era 1923-1939*

INTRODUCTION

As the WWI was resulted in catastrophic defeat for Bulgaria and Turkey, this was the sign of the difficult times for them. This alliance relationship did not benefit both states, and Bulgaria and Turkey, were forced to sign an armistice with very severe conditions. Apart from the territorial losses, the Turks had experienced events that led to the loss of their political existence, while the Bulgarians had lost a large part of its territory. Since the Turkish National Movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal was

Doi: 10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023/ejoss_v02i2004

considered as the beginning of the destruction of the Versailles system, which was imposed by victorious states to the defeated states to accept it after the WWI, it was followed with great interest and some hopes in Bulgaria. Besides, as it left a large amount of its territory to Yugoslavia and Romania with the Treaty of Neuilly which was imposed under the name of the peace agreement at the Paris Conference, Bulgaria left Western Thrace under the control of the victors.

The leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union Aleksandar Stambolijski, who came to power in March 1920 in Bulgaria, took care not to provoke the Allied Powers in the hope of changing the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly. For this reason, he avoids openly and directly developing diplomatic contacts with Turkey, which has no territorial problems between them in the Balkans. However, this does not prevent him from approaching the resistance movement in Turkey with sympathy. The close relations that started with the Stambolijski's government had a positive impact on the conditions of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria at the same time. The Turkish minority in Bulgaria started to be a determinant subject in the relations between the two countries during the interwar era between the two world wars, both in terms of migration and socio-economic and cultural issues. During this period, a various treaties were signed between the two countries. For instance, the Treaty of Friendship signed in 1925 stated that there would be a lasting peace, sincere and eternal friendship between Ankara and Sofia.

After the coup, overthrow Stambolijski's government and assassination of Stambolijski in 1923, the political relationship of contiguous countries altered dramatically. The policies against the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, therefore, also began to radical change. With this changing political conjuncture in towards to Turks of Bulgaria from the Bulgarian government, a national awakening has begun among them. In related to that, Turkish National Movement has also brought into the open national feelings for Turkish minority in Bulgaria during 1920s. Thus, the cultural and social organizations were formed among the Turkish minority. These attempts were concerned as a possible internal social disorder in Bulgaria from Bulgarian government due to the Turkish population.

By the 1930s, the increasing economic problems brought by the great depression and the changing government policies were also effective in shaping the policies on minorities. As a result of successive military coups and

government policies in Bulgaria, pressure on the Turkish minority was increased from time to time. However, as well as mutual high-level political visits and conciliatory attitudes between the two countries, the conditions of the Turkish minority in bilateral relations have started to change according to the political stability. In conjunction with that, Bulgaria, which did not take willingly to this idea when the Balkan Entente was on the agenda in 1930s, became a country that was given importance in bilateral relations in order to continue the politics in the Balkans peacefully with the initiatives of Turkey.

During this time, the Turks of Bulgaria, were influenced by the politics of both countries, have become the decisive element in bilateral relations. The main aim of this article is to emphasize the living conditions of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, within the framework of the experiences between 1923 and 1939 and how the political conjuncture and social dynamics changed the bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Turkey.

Historical Overview: Ottoman-Bulgarian alliance

The beginning of Ottoman-Bulgarian diplomatic relations was the 1878 Berlin Agreement. Bulgarians, who were formerly under the Ottoman rule, gained an autonomous Bulgarian Principality with this agreement. Since Bulgarian independence from Ottoman rule in 1878 political action in Bulgaria has been directed toward the creation of a territorially, culturally and linguistically unified nation-state by eliminating cultural diversity through migration of the country's ethnic minorities.¹

Later, in 1908, it unilaterally declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire and became the Kingdom of Bulgaria. It cannot be said that Ottoman-Bulgarian relations, which started after the establishment of the Kingdom of Bulgaria, were placed on a friendly axis until before the WWI. The Balkan Wars had a great place in the negativity of these relations. However, in the Second Balkan War, the loss of territory experienced by Bulgaria brought them closer on the eve of WWI.

For the Bulgarians, WWI was a prolongation of a period of warfare which had begun with the Balkan Wars in 1912-13. Bulgarian involvement in all three military operations was motivated by transborder nationalism. In other words, it was the longing for territorial enlargement, in order to

¹ Ali Eminov, *Turkish and other Muslim Minorities of Bulgaria*, 1997, p.4.

include within the state borders the co-nationals who were still under Ottoman rule, that is, the entire alleged nation.² Although the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria deteriorated due to the Balkan Wars, they were restored the relations after the Gallipoli Campaign in the WWI. The reason for this was that when Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers, it became an ally of the Ottoman Empire.

At the end of the WWI, the Ottoman Empire signed the Armistice of Mudros with the Allied Powers. As a result, the Allied Powers had occupied the lands (Misak-ı Milli³ Boundaries) of the Ottoman Empire after this armistice. Aside from that, Bulgaria signed the Armistice of Salonica. According to the Treaty of Salonica, which was a full surrender document, the Allied Powers began to occupy Bulgaria and gained the superior position in Eastern Europe. As a result of the WWI, Bulgaria and Turkey were forced to cut off relations with all of its former allies, including each other, in accordance with armistices which they signed at the end of the war. Their diplomatic relations would have continued through the Spanish embassy in Sofia for Turkey, and the Swedish embassy in Istanbul for Bulgaria.⁴

Diplomatic Rapprochement in 1920s

The defeat of Bulgaria in the WWI brings with internal turmoil in the country and as a result, in 1919, a revolution took place in Bulgaria. After the revolution, Stambolijski's Bulgarian Agrarian National Union came to the government by election in May 1920. This period of administration has been a period in which the Turkish minority was partially in peaceful situation and their rights were recognized. The Stambolijski's government did not make any innovations directly related to the Turkish minority. However, since 80% of Turks were farmers, political changes made in favor of the farmers had positive results for the Turks.⁵ In this period, the Turkish population in Bulgaria gained freedoms such as using their own language in social life and in their education, living their culture, opening their schools, and worshiping freely according to their own religion.⁶ In

² Eleonora Naxidou, *Bulgarian Historiography and World War I*, Bulgarian Studies Association, Vol.2, 2018, p.97.

³ National Pact, it is a six-point statement that is the political manifesto of the Turkish War of Independence in 1920.

⁴ Veysi Akın, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Bulgaristan Arasında Siyasi İlişkilerin Kurulmasında 1925 Dostluk Antlaşması'nın Yeri ve Önemi*, [The Place and Importance of the 1925 Friendship Treaty in the Establishment of Political Relations between the Republic of Turkey and Bulgaria], "Balkan Araştırma Enstitüsü Review", Vol. 1, N. 1, 2012, p. 43.

⁵ Bilal Şimşir, *Bulgaristan Türkleri 1878-2008*, [Turks of Bulgaria 1878-2008], Bilgi, 2012, p.65.

⁶ Yüksel Kaştan, *Atatürk Dönemi Türkiye-Bulgaristan İlişkileri*, [Ataturk Era Turkey-Bulgaria Relations], in

particular, this positive attitude can be given as an example to the reforms initiated by Stambolijski, especially, in the education of the Turkish minority. It was hugely essential that Stambolijski was in need of Turkish minority in its agriculture-based economy. For this reason, the Bulgarian government took initiatives to provide the guarantees for the rights of the Turkish minority's culture, religion and education in the country. So, Bulgaria has followed a policy which was to establish good relations with both Turkey and the Turkish population in Bulgaria during this period.

Turkish officials also were followed closely Bulgarian politics with an idea of a possible alliance in this period. Because Turkish authorities were trying to be successful in Thrace in order to keep Eastern Thrace within the borders of Misak-ı Milli. With this notion in mind, the Bulgarian officials should have guaranteed for this purpose for an understanding and cooperation. However, Greece started to occupy Western Thrace in May 1920. In addition, the occupation of Western Thrace by Greece caused reactions also in the Bulgarian public opinion, and this issue enabled Bulgaria and Turkey to get closer in terms of alliance after WWI in order to keep Eastern and Western Thrace away from the Greeks.⁷

Another effect in this positive attitude was that Turkey's success in the National Movement on the Bulgarian government's perspective. Although the relations between the two countries were brought to the desired levels with the rapprochements, the government's inability in Bulgaria to provide economic comfort after the WWI, the government collapsed with a coup under the leadership of nationalists. Thus, Stambolijski loses both power and his life. After the coup in Bulgaria, the government fell into the hands of radical nationalist Aleksandar Tsankov.⁸ After the coup of nationalists, Simeon Radev, a graduate of Galatasaray High School (Istanbul, Turkey) and an experienced diplomat with an impeccable Turkish speaker, replaced with Todor Markov, the former Consul General of Bulgaria to Edirne, who came to Turkey between 21-31 January 1923. This reassignment had a positive effect on the talks, which started on 10 June 1924, and focused on long-pending issues, such as immigrants and their property, minority

"Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Review", Vol. 24, N. 72, 2008, p. 673.

⁷ Bülent Yıldırım and Harun Bekir, *Atatürk Döneminde Türkiye Cumhuriyeti - Bulgaristan İlişkileri*, [Relations of the Republic of Turkey and Bulgaria During Atatürk's Era], in the Editorial Book of Turkish Foreign Policy During Atatürk's Era 1920-1938: Caucasasia, Balkans, Middle East from Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Aspects, 2018, p.69.

⁸ Kaştan, op.cit., pp. 671.

rights, Bulgarian schools in Turkey, the Bulgarian Exarchate in Istanbul, and Turkish schools in Bulgaria.⁹ Markov had a very friendly meeting with Mustafa Kemal in Izmir and both sides were pleased with this meeting.¹⁰

The positivity between these two countries at the beginning of the 1920s created the first Friendship Treaty, Additional Protocol, and Residence Agreement which was signed in Ankara in order to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries in accordance with international law. The Treaty of Friendship signed on 18 October 1925 by Tevfik Kamil, the Undersecretary of the Ministry on behalf of Turkey, and Simeon Radev on behalf of Bulgaria, entered into force mutually on 17 August 1926. Thus, after the WWI, Turkey and Bulgaria officially resumed the political relations they had broken apart from their own initiative in accordance with the armistice agreements signed by both countries with the Allied Powers. Also, in the re-establishment of Turkish-Bulgarian rapprochement and diplomatic relations, President Mustafa Kemal and Tsar III. Boris' contributions were great.¹¹

The treaty essentially expected the establishment of a long-lasting peace and eternal friendship between Turkey and Bulgaria, and immediately starting of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The Turkish-Bulgarian Friendship Treaty signed between Turkey and Bulgaria was vital importance for the Turkish minority. Because the migration of Turks living in Bulgaria to the homeland for the first time was regulated with this treaty and, many diplomatic visits were made with the initiatives of Mustafa Kemal and the warm rapprochement of Bulgaria, with the aim of both creating a peaceful atmosphere in the Balkans and protecting the rights of the Turkish minority.

Furthermore, during this period, some consultations were held between the two countries in the economic field. The Trade and Navigation Agreement, which was about commercial relations between both countries, was signed on 12 February 1928 and put into effect. In accordance with the agreement made, the products specified in both countries will be sold to other countries both internationally. This agreement was very important for Turkey, because Turkey has gained significant benefits in terms of exports and im-

⁹ Yıldıırım and Bekir, *op.cit.*, p.65.

¹⁰ Akın, *op.cit.*, p. 46.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

ports with European countries in the process.¹²

Changing political atmosphere and the World Economic Crisis of 1929

The government of Tsankov remained in power in Bulgaria until 1926. However, political power changed hands with another military coup of Andrey Lyapchev in 1926. The new government sets out with the slogan “Bulgaria belongs to the Bulgarians” and naturally this new policy of the government brought pressures on the minorities. This new policy of government was kept far away from the concept of nation by the new government and was limited to only ethnic origin, in other words ideal homogenous state. With this new policy, the relations between the two states continued to follow a declining course due to new politics’ attitude to the Turkish presence in Bulgaria and ideological approaches.

In accordance to Friendship Treaty of 1925, the Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation, Judicial Resolution and Arbitration was signed on 6 March 1929 between Bulgaria and Turkey in order to strengthen the political ties. This treaty recorded the basic principles such as staying neutral in case of a possible war, finding a peaceful solution to disputes, and operating the arbitration institution.¹³ There were very detailed articles on how to resolve any disputes that may arise between the two states, as well as the determination and functioning of the arbitrators. However, at the same time, there were changing conditions under the world economic crisis in 1929; consequently, there was a decrease in the trade capacity between the two countries.

As a result of the political and economic instability that started in Bulgaria in 1930, with the initiative of Democratic Party Leader Aleksandar Malinov, all opponents were united under the name of the Popular Front. They won the elections in June 1931. Due to Malinov’s health problems, he handed over his duties to Nikola Mushanov in October 1931. During this period of power, which continued until the military coup on 19 May 1934, Bulgaria followed a revisionist policy. It maintained its current claims, such as territorial claims against its neighbors, in this period as well.¹⁴

¹² Kaştan, op.cit., pp. 686.

¹³ Mustafa Göleç, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye Gazetesine Göre Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Türkiye-Bulgaristan İlişkileri (1923-1930)*, [Turkey-Bulgaria Relations in the First Years of the Republic, According to Hakimiyet-i Milliye Newspaper (1923-1930)], “Türkiyat Mecmuası Review”, Vol.26, N.1, 2016, p.160.

¹⁴ Yıldırım and Bekir, op.cit., p.75.

On the one hand, according to the Treaty which was signed in 1929, mutual visits started between the two countries and the first visit was made in 1931. The Bulgarian Prime Minister Mushanov visited Ankara with the effect of the political relations between Turkey and Bulgaria at the beginning of the 1930s. As Mushanov continued to say positive words in favor of Turkey in his country, and next appointment was held in Sofia on 20 September 1933 by Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras. As one of the positive achievements of the visit, the continuity of Treaty of 1929 was extended for 5 more years with the additional protocol which was signed in 1934. During the period of these positive developments, a change in power took place in Bulgaria, and this was resulted as an increasing pressure on the Turkish minority.¹⁵

The world economic crisis in 1929 and regime changes in Bulgaria also brought about different nationalist organizations in the Bulgarian popular base. Between these years, two main Bulgarian nationalist organizations were emerged in Bulgaria. One was born as “Rodna Zashtita” (Motherland Defense) in Northern Bulgaria and the second as “Thrace” Committees in Southern Bulgaria.¹⁶ One of the main activities has been their oppression and attacks that the Turkish minority in Bulgaria has been subjected to. For instance, a Turkish cemetery in Razgrad (Bulgaria), was destroyed by Bulgarian activists affiliated with the Rodna Zashtita organization in 1933. Although they did not represent a large part of the society, they were influential on political life with their aggression. Some Turks, who could not stand these persecutions, were forced to migrate to Romania. The opinion of the authorities in Turkey was seen that even the acceptance of all its Turkish speaking Muslim minority cognates to homeland within the framework of a certain plan. It was considered that the Turkish government was worried that the security of life and property of its compatriots in Bulgaria. Turkish officials were of the opinion that Turkish minority would completely disappear and that they could be assimilated in the long term as a result of pressure.

Moreover, the negotiations were being held by Turkish officials to relocate Turkish minority from Bulgaria to certain parts of Turkey. Mustafa

¹⁵ Esra S. Değerli, Hasan Karakuzu, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın Türkiye-Bulgaristan İlişkilerine Etkisi*, [The Effect of the Second World War on Turkey-Bulgaria Relations], *History Studies Review*, Vol.14, N.2, 2022, p.428.

¹⁶ Hüsamettin İnaç and Betül Yazıcı, *Bulgaristan'dan Türkiye'ye Göçler, Bulgaristan Diasporası ve Uluslaşma*, [Immigration Waves from Bulgaria to Turkey, Bulgarian Diaspora and Nation Building], “Balkan and Near Eastern Journal of Social Sciences”, Vol. 4, N.4, 2018, pp.80-81.

Kemal's settlement policy in this period, was generally based on demographic and economic principles. By means of migrations, the population of the Republic of Turkey would be increased and the country would have a homogeneous structure with this settlement policy. In addition, it was desired to create a nation that would easily adapt to each other and be united around the same ideal.

Hence, the Turkish officials has worked on bringing the Turkish minority in Bulgaria to the motherland. In accordance with the agreements made in the period of Mustafa Kemal, a fairly smooth migration flow from Bulgaria to Turkey has begun. 15-20 thousand Turks came to Turkey from Bulgaria every year in the 1930s. There was no collapse in the Bulgarian economy, as there was no mass migration. Since the Turkish minority came with their movable properties, they did not become an economic burden to Turkey either. In this period, the annual average of immigrants in Bulgaria was about 17 thousand.¹⁷

Rising revisionist policies and the Balkan Entente

The impoverishment that took place with the Great Depression also strengthened the right-wing and racist tendencies in Bulgaria. Fascist associations activated in the country, inspired by ideology of Hitler, wanted to intimidate the Turkish minority as well as other minorities.

In 1934 Damian Velchev-Kimon Georgiev's government came to power after a coup and subsequently carried out many administrative reforms including a far-reaching policy of changing the Turkish names of settlements. Two-thirds of all Turkish place names and settlements were changed by ministerial orders in 1934 alone.¹⁸ And this changing political atmosphere was brought the necessity of establishing regional pacts in the Balkans rather than the states being in opposite camps. However, Bulgaria, which followed a revisionist policy between 1931 and 1934, did not favor the Balkan Entente due to its territorial demands from the past. The idea of establishing the Balkan Entente, which could be seen as Turkey's policy of convergence with the Balkan countries, was to ensure Turkey's regional security and at the same time to consolidate its goodwill relations with the Balkan countries.

¹⁷ Şimşir, op.cit., pp.492-493.

¹⁸ Milena Mahon, *The Turkish minority under Communist Bulgaria – politics of ethnicity and power*, Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol.1, N.2, 1999, p.154.

Georgi Kjosivanov who came to power in Bulgaria in 1935, was known his closeness with the Axis Powers¹⁹ in this period. As such, Bulgaria was the only state that was not disturbed by Italy's expansionist policy in the Balkans in this period. Italy has also backed up Bulgaria for its own interests in the region.²⁰

Although there was not a great deal on political relations between Turkey and Bulgaria, it was a fact that the relations could not be raised to the desired level. Turkey's support of maintaining the status quo in Balkan region and Bulgaria's following a revisionist policy were the biggest obstacles to a solid union between the two countries.²¹ The political relations between the two countries were partially damaged by the fact that they started to take place in different camps as of 1929, Turkey has also made efforts for Bulgaria to enter the Balkan Entente. On the contrary, in Bulgaria, when various talks and conferences were held since 1929 for the establishment of a Balkan Entente, nationalist groups in Bulgaria carried out various activities that brought up the territorial demands of the neighboring Balkan countries.

Whilst Bulgaria did not give up on its regional territorial claims, while Turkey adopted regional peace as its fundamental principle, it was of the opinion that peace and friendship agreements would be important steps for this purpose. For this reason, the first step in the formation of a regional peace was the Balkan Entente. In fact, this region has had a feature that expansionist states had always easily used and mobilized for its own purposes. Therefore, the ideas of creating unity in the region accelerated in this period. While no country was distinguished in these initiatives, the revisionist foreign policy determined by Bulgaria for itself made the environment difficult to reach the target.²² Also, the territorial losses resulting from the abandoning of Western Thrace to Greece took away Bulgaria's right of direct access to the Aegean Sea.

¹⁹ Aix Powers were a military coalition that initiated World War II and fought against the Allies. Its principal members were Nazi Germany, the Kingdom of Italy, and the Empire of Japan.

²⁰ Esra S. Değerli, *Türkiye'nin Balkan Ülkelerine Yakınlaşma Çalışmaları: Balkan Paktı*, [Turkey's Efforts to Improve Relations with Balkan Countries: Balkan Pact], Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Review, Vol.9, N.2, 2008, p. 119.

²¹ Aptülhahat Akşin, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri Diplomasisi*, [Atatürk's Foreign Policy Principles Diplomacy], 1991, p.247.

²² İhsan Sabri Balkaya, *Basınımıza Yansdığı Şekliyle Balkan Antantı Sürecinde Türkiye ve Bulgaristan*, [Turkey and Bulgaria in Media the Period Balkanian Pact], Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Review, Vol.20, N.10, 2004, p.764.

The determined attitude of Turkey on the creation of the Balkan Entente was given in the form of the First Balkan Conference in Athens on 5 October 1930. Bulgaria attended this first meeting with its representatives. The Second Conference was held in Istanbul in 1931. Since Bulgaria did not take kindly to the idea of establishing this entente at this conference, it kept its distance on the issue. In 1932 the third Conference was held in Bucharest and Bulgaria withdrew from the Conference.²³ Despite Turkey's intense efforts, Bulgaria did not join the Balkan Pact which was signed on 9 February 1934. Bulgaria's desire was having an exit to the Aegean Sea via Greece and the problem of territorial claims in the region prevented this situation.

The relations between Bulgaria and Turkey have started to begin to normalize after the visits of Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras to Sofia in 1937. The negotiations were held with Prime Minister Kjöseivanov. Bulgarian officials purposed to remove the articles limiting the armament of Bulgaria and to improve relations with other Balkan Entente member countries. Bulgaria was pleased with this effort of Turkey. As a matter of fact, as a result of these efforts, the Salonika Agreement in 1938 between the member states of the Balkan Entente and Bulgaria.²⁴ This was the last mediation attempt between Bulgaria and the Balkan States, made in interwar era. Whilst the parties affirmed that not to use force in order to solve the disagreements, Bulgaria was released from the military commitments and restrictions it has undertaken with the Neuilly Agreement.

Turkish minority in Bulgaria 1923-1939

The alliance of Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire during the WWI was an important factor in Bulgaria's change of attitude towards the Turks in the country at the end of the war. During the period of Stambolijski, who came to power at the end of the war and remained in power until 1923, the Turkish minority could live smoothly. The basic philosophy of Stambolijski government focused on the farmers and the peasants were factors that help to improve relations. Approximately, 90% of Turks living in Bulgaria was coming from the peasant class. And the Bulgarian government did not dissociate its own target audience due to ethnic elements during this period

²³ Ibid., p.766.

²⁴ Yıldırım and Bekir, op.cit., p.79.

provided that Turkish minority was close to the government of Stambolijski, and their closeness was reflected in the relations between the governments.²⁵ However, there were some difficulties during this period as well. Unfortunately, the tolerant attitude of the Bulgarian authorities did not last long. After the assassination of the Agrarian Premier Stambolijski in 1923 the situation of the Turkish minority began to deteriorate.²⁶

The treaty of Friendship, Additional Protocol, and Residence Agreement signed between Turkey and Bulgaria in 1925 mutually regulated the migrations between the two countries. Accordingly, the two countries would not prevent the Turkish minority from migrate voluntarily by taking their movable properties with them. The Bulgarian government has committed to the Turkish government to develop the Turkish minority living in Bulgaria, to gain a benefit from all the provisions regarding the protection of minorities which were written in the Neuilly Treaty signed by Bulgaria at the end of the WWI. In other words, the Turkish minority's freedom of religion, using Turkish language in social and education life, Turkish newspaper publishing and forming an association etc., they would have own independence. The Bulgarian government was undertaken not to put any obstacles or to impose any restrictions on the rights and freedoms of the Turkish minority.

Turkish-Bulgarian political relations were shaped around the economic negotiations because of the economic crisis of 1929 and the issues of Turkish minority because of the changing political atmosphere in Bulgaria between 1926 and 1929.²⁷ In 1926, Premier Lyapchev's formula "Bulgaria belongs to Bulgarians" left the Turkish minority in a difficult circumstance. Pressures in the social, cultural, economic and political fields had led Turkish minority living in the region to migrate to Turkey, as before. Additionally, the nationalist policies of Bulgaria and the consequent oppression to minorities, pushed the Turkish minority to unite and organize well together. They were activating this uniting through the organizations they had established in Bulgaria. Two important organizations that had a great role in the life of Turkish minority were the Turkish Teachers' Union and the Turan Society. For instance, The Turkish Teachers' Union worked

²⁵ A. Baran Dural, *Turkish - Bulgarian Relations within the Kemalist Era*, Management and Education Academic Journal, Vol.8, N.3, 2012, p.17.

²⁶ Eminov, op.cit., p.126.

²⁷ Ahmet Özgiray, *Türk-Bulgar Siyasî İlişkileri (1920-1938)*, [Political Relations between Turkey and Bulgaria (1920-1938)], Tarih İncelemeleri Review, Vol. 10, N.1, 1995, pp. 58-60.

to provide Turkish language education in parallel to their homeland, and to increase Turkish education to a modern level in Bulgaria. Especially, Turkey's transition to the Latin alphabet in 1928, it was decided to start education with the new Turkish letters in Bulgaria. Initially, the Bulgarian government banned the use of these Turkish letters, but later released them. This union was in favor of both to adopt the Turkish language in education and to strengthen ties with Mustafa Kemal's Turkey. However, the activities of the Turkish Teachers' Union were banned again by the Bulgarian government in 1933 on the eve of the Balkan Entente.²⁸

The Turan Society as another organization, was aiming to get together and develop the Turkish youth in Bulgaria. This society was tried to adopt the Turkish minority the Kemalist revolutions in 1926.²⁹ In fact, it's first formation was the Turkish Sports Union formed by various Turkish minority's youth sports clubs in Bulgaria, and later changed its name to Turan society. They did not see sports activities alone as sufficient after they re-named the society, and they wanted to promote Mustafa Kemal's main principles in the Turkish minority's youth in Bulgaria. However, the society, whose last congress was held in 1933, was closed by the Bulgarian authorities the following year. Some of the members, who were unemployed and did not see themselves as safe situation, immigrated to Turkey in 1930s.

The living conditions of Turkish minority became increasingly difficult in the 1930s. More and more schools were closed and Turkish minority newspapers ceased to appear.³⁰ During the time, the main idea of Turkish newspapers on the Bulgarian agenda was, despite all the persecution of the Bulgarian government, in the direction of not migrate to Turkey. These newspapers made an effort to discourage Turkish minority from emigration.³¹ The idea was that wanted to organize together and stand strong against the Bulgarian government.

While oppressions continued on the Turkish minority starting from 1924 until 1934 in Bulgaria, cultural relations between the two countries also continued peacefully. In 1931, Bulgarian Prime Minister Mushanov visited Turkey. As a result of his visit, the positive atmosphere between the two

²⁸ Kaştan, op.cit., pp. 684.

²⁹ Şimşir, op.cit., pp.118-119.

³⁰ Bjorn-Cato Funnemark, *The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria*, Proceedings of the International Symposium of Jurists on the Question of Turkish Moslem Minority in Bulgaria, Organized by the Istanbul Bar Association, 1987, p.148.

³¹ İnaç and Yazıcı, op. cit., p.81.

countries was also reflected in the cultural relations. These bureaucratic meetings between two countries played an important role in the development of educational and cultural relations on the minority issue. Bulgarian delegations visited Turkish cities such as Edirne, Bursa, Istanbul while Turkish delegations visited cities such as Sofia and Varna. As a matter of fact, Mustafa Kemal, who was the military attaché in Sofia between 1913-1914, had a great impact in the future established relations.³² During his time in there, Mustafa Kemal established close relations with senior civil and military Bulgarian officials, and respected by the Bulgarians.³³ For this reason, Mustafa Kemal was knowing both this country and its bureaucracy well. After the Turkish National Movement and the proclamation of the Republic, it has provided a great advantage on the relations with Bulgaria on the minority issue.

For instance, with the initiative of a group of Bulgarian intellectuals, the Bulgarian Turkish Society was established in Sofia. According to this, another Society was founded in Ankara in 1930s. The aim of this associations was to work on the development of political, economic, social and cultural relations between Turkey and Bulgaria. For these purposes, mutual visits, academic meetings and similar programs were organized in order to reinforce the relations between two countries.³⁴ These visits, within the changing political atmosphere in this period, there were beneficial exchanges between the two countries mostly in the field of culture and education.

In fact, cultural and social relations played a positive role in the normalization of political relations, which were occasionally strained. The reason for this situation was that Turks and Bulgarians have a common historical background and a centuries-old culture of coexistence. Another important factor in cultural and social relations was the presence of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.³⁵

CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, Bulgaria, entered the WWI as an ally with Turkey and were defeated. Bulgaria signed the Neuilly Treaty after the war, and with this

³² Bahar Toparlak, *1930'lu Yıllarda Türkiye-Bulgaristan Arasında Sosyo-Kültürel ve Eğitim Amaçlı Seyahatler*, [Cultural and Educational Journeys Between Turkey and Bulgaria During the Years of 1930], *Journal of History and Future*, Vol.2, N.2, 2016, pp. 142-143.

³³ Yıldırım and Bekir, *op.cit.*, p.67.

³⁴ Göleç, *op.cit.*, p.163.

³⁵ Yıldırım and Bekir, *op.cit.*, p.89.

agreement, the rights and freedoms of the minorities were guaranteed. During the interwar era, Turkey and Bulgaria has signed agreements on minority issues and on trade. After the WWI, Bulgaria brought broad rights to the Turkish population both in accordance with the Neuilly Treaty and in the stage of re-establishing the administration in the country (1919-1926). The provisions of this agreement also have included the Turkish minority living in the region, although they were not one of the parties to the agreement. In this sense considering the important developments in the country from the Neuilly Treaty to the end of 1939, the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey and the situation and general problems of the Turkish minority can be examined in two stages.

First stage was the period when the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union was in power, the Turkish minority lived their most peaceful days. At the same time, the Bulgarian-Turkish relations established during the National Movement in Turkey undoubtedly positively affected the cooperation and rapprochement between the two countries. These relations gained a greater vitality during this period. During this period, the Turkish minority was able to teach Turkish language in their own private schools and develop their social and cultural activities, and also, they were able to freely practice their religious activities. Again, at the same time, with an agreement signed between Turkey and Bulgaria, the legal basis of migration between the two countries was established. As a result of these efforts, the Turkish-Bulgarian Friendship Treaty emerged in 1925 and, the basic problems regarding the rights of minorities were resolved, as well as the initiation of political relations between the two countries. These efforts made at that time are also of great importance in terms of today's political relations and, the positive progress of relations between Turkey and Bulgaria also contributed to the protection of the rights of the Turkish minority.

During this period, Turkey defended the aspect that Turkish minority should be integrated into their country politically and economically. There was a policy that specifically stated that steps that might encourage separatist or violent movements between the two countries in the long run should be avoided. However, Turkey was trying to preserve the cultural identity of the Turkish minority and to strengthen their historical ties with Turkey in the interwar era. While following this policy, it has always continued to pursue regional constructive policies towards Bulgaria.

Second stage was the political relations between the two countries were

partially damaged by the fact that they started to take part in different camps as of 1929, Turkey made efforts for Bulgaria to enter the Balkan Pact. After the 1930s, the pressure on the Turkish minority was beginning to increase with the change of Bulgarian government's attitude. With the change of regional policies of Bulgaria, Turkey would not abandon its regional policies based on conciliatory and direct diplomacy, and as a requirement of this, it would continue to endeavor to maintain its neighborly relations with Bulgaria. On the other hand, Bulgaria aimed to establish strong ties between Turkey and the Turkish minority through cultural and social exchanges as well as political relations. At the end of 1931, Bulgarian Prime Minister Mushanov visited Ankara. In the second half of 1933, a Turkish delegation headed by İsmet İnönü went to Bulgaria. The Turkish Prime Minister was warmly welcomed by the Bulgarian public and during this visit, the duration of the Friendship Treaty was extended and initiatives for cooperation were determined. After the coup in 1934 in Bulgaria the relations have started to be strained, however, the relations between two states started to normalize again in 1937.

Turkey, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, appointed Prime Minister Celal Bayar and Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras to Bulgaria in May 1938, within the framework of the continuity of its foreign policy towards the Balkans. During the meeting, Tsar III. Boris and Prime Minister Kjo-seivanov, it was stated that Turkey made efforts to abolish the heavy provisions and sanctions imposed on Bulgaria by the Neuilly Treaty of 1919, and wanted Sofia to improve its relations with the other member states of the Balkan Entente. Bulgarian government also stated that they are satisfied with this approach of Turkey. In brief, the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria have improved by taking effective and constructive steps between Ankara and Sofia in the interwar era. In addition to these effective and constructive steps of political relations between two parties, the main issues regarding the Turkish minority were also developed in constructive way in the interwar period, with the positive attitude of both sides.

A LIFE DEVOTED TO HUMANITY

Muzaffer Baca is one of the founders of IBC (International Blue Crescent Relief and Development Foundation) a Turkish NGO, operating worldwide to respond to the needs of humanity. Recently it has very much focused on the Syrian and Ukrainian Crises. The purpose of this interview is to know something more about the feelings that prompted him and his organization for such a tough humanitarian task.

1. Where did your journey to humanitarian relief work begin after years of journalism? Can you briefly talk about this story? Where and how did you first meet with civil society activities and humanitarian relief projects?

As International Blue Crescent Relief and Development Foundation (IBC), we work with the aim of producing appropriate and effective humanitarian solutions for the most challenging regions of a rapidly changing world. We have developed hundreds of impartial and independent projects aimed at improving human life as well as meeting vital needs all over the world without any discrimination. Our common responsibilities and most important work motivation come from wanting to help those deprived of their right to live.

2. Coming to the present, can you briefly talk about the projects that IBC has developed in Turkey and abroad in the last 5 years?

To summarize briefly, we have been providing emergency aid, health, education, rehabilitation, protection and social cohesion support at local, national, and international levels in the last 5 years. In all the projects we have been developing around the world, we have been collaborating with local and national authorities, other NGOs, global donors, universities and research centers by incorporating their resources, technical expertise and

Doi: 10.17932/EJOSS.2021.023/ejoss_v02i2005

experience into our own way of working. The projects we develop make a difference in integration into society, social cohesion, psychosocial support, access to education, access to health services, social development, women's empowerment, gender equality and sustainable livelihoods within the framework of fundamental rights and needs.

3. IBC expanded its work on refugees, especially after the Syrian crisis in 2011. Turkey is in a very strategic situation in this regard, especially at the moment. However, refugees are currently the main and hottest agenda item not only in Turkey but also in the whole world. Can you tell us about the projects that IBC has developed for refugees both in Turkey and around the world?

With the addition of the Ukraine war to the wars and conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Sudan and other African countries, this year the plight of refugees began to be felt even more than in the past. As IBC, we meet the urgent needs of refugees and displaced migrants, which we refer to as IDP, both in Turkey and in all the other countries experiencing this crisis. We also carry out education, health, protection and social cohesion activities so that refugees are not deprived of their fundamental rights and freedoms. We have been in the hot zone since the first day of the Syrian crisis. At the same time, we established support centers for refugees coming to the Turkish border and carried out studies to ensure that they can be integrated into society in a healthy way. Currently, these centers in Istanbul, Kilis, Konya and Şanlıurfa provide services not only to Syrians but also to people of many different nationalities such as Afghan, African and Uyghur Turks. In addition, we continue to meet basic humanitarian needs and provide emergency aid in Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Yemen, Afghanistan, and as of this year, in Ukraine and Moldova.

4. What will Turkey and the world face in this regard in the coming days? Could you share this question with us both as a journalist and as a humanitarian Relief Projects Manager?

Turkey is in a critical position as a country placed in the middle of all crises: the Syrian, the Ukrainian and the Iranian. Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus are areas like a powder cake and Pandora's box. Turkey is hosting around 8 millions refugees and facing critical economic problems that foster social instability as security threats.

5. In 2022, humanitarian relief work shifted and focused on Europe.
–What are your assessments of the Ukraine-Russia war?

As I forecasted at the beginning of the War Russia's invasion to Ukraine is a global threat, especially to Europe and Turkey. In addition, I don't believe that the war is going to end in short term. Because no one of the sides can surrender - either NATO/Ukraine axis or Russia. The war created a new Ukrainian nation so in the future the war is likely to affect the entire Russian Federation which is composed by many different ethnic groups.

6. Can you provide us with updated info about the relief and support projects that IBC has initiated for Ukraine?

Millions of Ukrainian refugees fled for safety to Europe through Moldova, Poland and Romania. The ones with financial capacity managed to go on westwards but thousands of Ukrainians, mainly women and children, are accommodated in Moldova. They are from the poorest communities of Ukraine and don't have any means to go further. They are in deep need of humanitarian assistance, protection and support. IBC has been operating in Moldova and Ukraine since the beginning of the crisis. IBC has reached more than 5000 people with protection services, food, water, medication, shelter materials and other life-critical items. IBC projects in Ukraine and Moldova include medical equipment, food, a mobile bakery with a capacity of 2000 loaves per day, a winterization campaign. On December 2022, IBC launched a reception center in Mykolayiv to meet the needs of IDPs from the war zone and all those affected by the conflict. The people of the war-torn region will be able to charge their phones, connect to the internet for free, get warm and find tea, coffee, soup and ready meals in

this reception center. IBC built a Health Center as well, which will be operational in the Bolgrad region of Odesa, the first of the 6 planned health centers, the other 5 to be built in Mykolayiv in the war-affected areas. The centers, which are planned to be completed by the end of the year, will be integrated into the Ukrainian health system and will work in coordination with local governments. The medical needs of the center, which will be delivered with health center furniture and all medical supplies, will continue to be met after it is put into service.

7. As the manager of an international humanitarian relief organization, you are located in different areas. What do you pay particular attention to in your working standards?

Our working standards are determined by internationally accepted basic humanitarian relief standards. Our motto “We created millions of smiling faces with hundreds of projects” constitutes our mission as well. However, when we look at it from the broadest perspective, we work to contribute to the UN Sustainable Development Goals and develop all our projects in accordance with the standards applied to achieve these goals. We carry out all our activities with the principle of independence and impartiality. In this context, before we start activities in the geographies we work in, we conduct extensive field research and analyses in order to understand the region, climate, geography and people of that region. In particular, our team has a deep knowledge of the region and takes action after completing the analysis for the needs of that region. We have a risk management policy and a security policy for all possible risks. In short, IBC displays all its basic principles and values in all its activities without any discrimination. In addition, it plans and analyzes the needs and risks that will arise according to the conditions of the region in which it will work, and in this frame starts its support activities.

8. What awaits the world in 2023? What is IBC’s target for 2023 and where will we see its work? Could you briefly talk about your 2023 plans?

In 2023, we will expand our work in Ukraine and Moldova. At the same time, we will continue to work on accessing the basic needs of Afghanistan, Yemen and Sahel Africa. In Turkey, the community centers we have established for the integration of refugees into society and their access to their fundamental rights will continue to operate. In addition, social cohesion activities, language courses for the host society and refugees and children's caravans, which we have put into operation especially for the children to grow up in a peace-based social order, will continue to work in 2023.

Code of Ethics

Our journal aims to collect academically valuable and original articles per each issue. Ethical principles and values are an integrated part of our journal. Five principles are the core of our Code of Ethics. They constitute a normative framework for all the scientific fields we care.

Principle A: Responsibility and Fairness

Researchers must be in the quest for the increase of knowledge and consciousness about an issue. They must not aim at harming any individual, society, institution or state. Their articles must be the outcome of a fair and balanced approach and aim at stimulating positive follow up.

Principle B: Competency

The submitted to the Editorial Board must look interesting, correctly written and valuable in terms of their direct contribution to specific literature. If they show these basic features they will be sent to the referees. We commit ourselves to analyze the manuscripts objectively, in terms of originality, accuracy, consistency, respect of the scientific methodology.

Principle C: Diversity and Non-discrimination

All the manuscripts are welcomed regardless of nationality, gender, ethnicity, religious views and political views, when notorious, of the author. Naturally the content of the submitted manuscripts must not be so biased by personal views as to compromise the scientific level of the texts.

Principle D: Confidentiality

Our journal aims at the preservation of any individual or institution against any possible annoyance or danger. The possible rejection of a submitted manuscript will be communicated privately to the author.

Principle E: Procedural Transparency

Researchers will be kept informed in each review procedure step. They must follow the requested timing for possible editing after the positive evaluation of the referees. Our journal will inform each contributor immediately after a decision has been made.